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Consumer product warranties are our most common of written con-
tracts, but little is known about what determines their content or how they
relate to the reliability and the durability of goods. Since the first appear-
ance of standardized warranties early in this century, two theories have
been proposed to explain their role in sales transactions. The first empha-
sizes the absence of bargaining over warranty provisions. It views warran-
ties as devices of manufacturers to exploit consumers by unilaterally limit-
ing legal obligations. The second and more recent theory focuses on the
difficulty consumers face at the time of purchase in estimating the risk of
product defects. This theory regards express warranties as messages sig-
naling the mechanical attributes of goods.
Both theories have influenced substantially judicial and legislative re-
sponses to product warranties. The view of the warranty as an exploita-
tive device has provided crucial support to the policy of enterprise liability
and the replacement of contract principles with tort principles in product
defect cases.' In addition, the exploitation theory is the intellectual basis
for the modern judicial treatment of consumer warranty issues, in particu-
lar for the expansive interpretation of warranties implied by law, for the
elimination of the requirement of privity of contract, and for the restric-
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tion of the manufacturer's authority to limit available remedies or to dis-
claim general obligations. 2 More recently, the signal theory has informed
the design of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,' which directly
regulates both the form and content of consumer product warranties.4
Neither the exploitation nor the signal theory, however, has contributed
to the understanding of warranty practices. The exploitation theory de-
rives from the presupposition of overwhelming manufacturer market
power, but the connection remains vague between the extent of market
power and the specific definition of warranty coverage. Similarly, the sig-
nal theory derives from the assumption of consumer misperception of
product risks. However plausible this assumption as a general matter,
consumer perceptions are very difficult to identify or to measure. As a
consequence, hypotheses concerning the relationship between perceptions
and specific warranty provisions are highly speculative and essentially
nonfalsifiable.
This article proposes a new theory of the standardized warranty and of
the determinants of the content of the warranties of individual products.
The first Part reviews in more detail the exploitation and signal theories
and their observable implications. Part II presents the theory itself. A
warranty is viewed as a contract that optimizes the productive services of
goods by allocating responsibility between a manufacturer and consumer
for investments to prolong the useful life of a product and to insure
against product losses. According to the theory, the terms of warranty con-
tracts are determined solely by the relative costs to the parties of these
investments. An insurance function of warranty coverage, of course, is
well-known.' The novelty of the theory is its emphasis on the variety of
allocative investments that consumers may make to extend productive ca-
pacity and its consideration of the difficulties of drafting warranty con-
tracts to encourage such investments.
The third Part compares the investment theory of the article with the
exploitation and signal theories in a review of the content of sixty-two
consumer product warranties. Although more comprehensive and detailed
data are needed for a confident judgment, the review demonstrates that the
content of these various warranties is generally more consistent with the
2. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 9-1 to -13, 11-1 to 12-12 (2d ed. 1980) (reviewing these developments).
3. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
637, §§ 101-112, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976)).
4. See pp. 1306-07 infra (discussing Act).
5. See e.g., Brown, Product Liability: The Case of an Asset with Random Life, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 149, 157-58 (1974). The description of a warranty as an insurance policy has not illuminated
specific warranty practices and has had little influence on the treatment of warranties in courts or
legislatures. Cf id. at 159-60 (impossible to determine a priori optimal distribution of product defect
risk between manufacturer and consumer).
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implications of the investment theory than of the exploitation or signal
theory. Finally, Part IV considers the implications of the investment the-
ory for questions of liability for product defects, including defects causing
personal injury. This Part shows that, if the investment theory explains
warranty practices, developments in modem warranty law are likely to
have increased, rather than diminished, the rate of product losses, includ-
ing personal injury losses.
I. The Implications of the Exploitation and Signal Theories for
Warranty Practices
During the last four decades, most approaches to consumer warranty
issues by courts and legislatures have accepted the presuppositions of ei-
ther the exploitation or signal theory. This Part defines the two theories
and their implications and reviews the empirical evidence that has led to
their acceptance.
A. The Exploitation Theory
Standardized product warranties were first introduced, apparently, in
the last decades of the nineteenth century.' Initially, these warranties were
treated as normal contracts. The principles of nineteenth-century contract
law derived from a view of the contract as an arms-length exchange be-
tween informed and competent parties. Because of its standardized charac-
ter, no bargaining between the parties or adjustment of the terms of war-
ranty contracts occurred. As a consequence, throughout the early decades
of the twentieth century, courts vacillated between enforcing warranties
strictly as normal contracts and enforcing them selectively according to
other conceptions of the exchange.7
Although common themes appear in early treatments,' a coherent and
persuasive theory of the standardized warranty first developed in the ex-
tensive literature and case law that followed Friedrich Kessler's celebrated
manifesto, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of
6. See Bogert & Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L.
REV. 400, 410-11 (1930).
7. Compare MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)
(irrespective of contract, automobile maufacturer liable for defects) with Cadillac Motor Car Co. v.
Johnson, 221 F. 801, 802 (2d Cir. 1915) (automobile manufacturer liable only to parties with whom
it has contractual relation). See, e.g., Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939)
(judges equipped to distinguish between freely bargained-for contracts, which they should enforce, and
contracts imposed on one party by another, the provisions of which should be interpreted more flex-
ibly) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Book Review]. The nineteenth-century implication of product
warranties (such as the warranty of merchantability or fitness), of course, represents a substitution of
a legal for a consensual standard of obligation. See generally Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and
Society (pt. 1), 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699 (1936).
8. E.g., Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 413-14; Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 7, at 704.
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Contract.9 According to the theory, a standardized contract is unique prin-
cipally because its terms are drafted unilaterally by the seller and only
involuntarily "adhered to" by the consumer.10 The seller possesses "unfet-
tered discretion"" to incorporate terms that serve its interests because its
bargaining position is superior to that of the consumer.12 In some indus-
tries, the manufacturer's superior position stems from the forces of natural
monopoly.13 In others, firms gain power by unleashing corporate weapons
such as patents 4 or tying arrangements."5  Kessler, in fact, believed that
standardized contracts themselves were "devices to build up and
strengthen industrial empires," contributing to what he viewed as the "in-
nate trend of competitive capitalism toward monopoly."'
Even in industries with multiple sellers, however, all warranties are
alike or substantially similar so that the consumer "is not in a position to
shop around for better terms." 7 Some manufacturers directly collude in
establishing warranty terms."8 Trade associations standardize warranty
practices to achieve the same result. 9 Thus, whether there is one seller or
many, the consumer possesses no meaningful choice. 20 In Kessler's words,
the consumer's "contractual intention is but a subjection more or less vol-
9. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 629-31 (1943); see Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 140-44 (1970) (discussing
history of contract-of-adhesion theory).
10. Kessler, supra note 9, at 632. See also Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504-05 & n.67 (1967) (discussing origins of "adhesion" meta-
phor). Kessler's principal focus was upon standardized insurance contracts, but the analysis has been
extended routinely to standardized product warranties. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 389-91, 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (1960); Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 413-14; Leff, supra
note 9, at 140-44. Kessler himself, however, thought that the problems of standardized insurance
contracts were substantially more serious than those of standardized product warranties. Kessler,
Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, 14 U. CHI. CONF. SER. 3, 9 (1954).
11. Kessler, supra note 9, at 640; Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study
of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1039.
12. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 389, 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (1960);
Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 413-14; Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 605 (1943); Kessler, supra note 9, at 632; Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 7, at
704.
13. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 632; Leff, supra note 9, at 141.
14. Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 414.
15. Whitford, supra note 11, at 1068-70.
16. Kessler, supra note 9, at 632, 640.
17. Id. at 632. Leff has emphasized that even if the consumer has a choice between different
warranties, the terms of either warranty cannot be varied, so no true assent is present. Leff, supra
note 9, at 142.
18. Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 414; Kessler, supra note 9, at 632; Leff, supra note 9, at 141.
19. See Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 407-09, 413-14. The efforts of trade associations were
emphasized in the judicial adoption of the exploitation theory. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375, 390-91, 161 A.2d 69, 78, 87 (1960).
20. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960); Bogert &
Fink, supra note 6, at 413; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 832 (1966); Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry:
Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83, 96-97.
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untary to terms dictated by the stronger party. 21
The exploitation theory predicts, in general, that manufacturers will
limit their legal obligations to consumers as much as possible.22 If collu-
sion is widespread, then warranties within individual industries- are likely
to be similar. It also would be consistent with the assumptions of the the-
ory, however, for the terms of coverage to be correlated with the degree of
manufacturer market power.23 Kessler believed that sellers are especially
likely to exclude coverage of risks that are difficult to calculate and of
unforseeable contingencies such as "strikes, fires and transport difficul-
ties." 24 He also predicted that manufacturers would attempt to incorporate
terms that reduce the risk of a court or jury being influenced by "'irra-
tional forces' to decide against a powerful defendant. "25 Kessler thought
this reason explained why manufacturers in the machinery industry, for
example, exclude warranty recovery for consequential damages.2
The exploitation theory does not specify unambiguously the relation-
ship between a manufacturer's warranty practices and its other production
or marketing decisions. In an early article, Dean Prosser argued that,
without judicial intervention to imply warranties of quality in sales trans-
actions, many manufacturers would provide consumers with "worthless
junk. '21 Such relationships, however, have not been addressed extensively.
More recent statements of the theory emphasize the marketing power
gained from coordinating advertising that makes extravagant promises to
consumers with warranties that disclaim responsibility for the promises.2 8
Professor Slawson, in fact, argues that all standardized contracts are in-
struments of this type of fraud .2
The exploitation theory found wide acceptance in part because it was
the only coherent explanation of standardized warranties until the 1970s.
The theory also seemed consistent with descriptions of warranty practices.
In an early empirical study of warranty content, Bogert and Fink found
widespread exclusions of coverage of component parts, transportation
21. Kessler, supra note 9, at 632.
22. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375-78, 161 A.2d 69, 78-80 (1960);
Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 411-13; Whitford, supra note 11, at 1041.
23. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 642; Leff, supra note 9, at 141.
24. Kessler, supra note 9, at 631 (referring specifically to insurance contracts, although principle
is general).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 632.
27. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 158-65
(1943).
28. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 373, 384-85, 161 A.2d 69, 77, 83-84
(1960); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1123 (1960).
29. Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1974). Pro-
fessor Posner also describes standardized contracts as serving fraudulent ends. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 85-86 (2d ed. 1977).
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costs, and consequential damages, as well as more general limitations of
warranty remedies.3" In addition, they claimed to identify a trend in war-
ranty content over time from broad assurances of product fitness toward
more narrow representations of strictly mechanical perfection of prod-
ucts." Kessler's wide experience with standardized contracts in the insur-
ance industry seemed to provide further support.12 More recently, Profes-
sor Whitford, in an intensive study of warranty practices in the
automobile industry, concluded that automobile manufacturers could draft
warranties in any manner desired, that warranties had in fact been
drafted to minimize manufacturer's costs, that many warranty provisions
were not "commercially justified," and that consumers did not possess suf-
ficient expertise to deal intelligently with the problems of product
defects.3
The most convincing evidence to support the exploitation theory, how-
ever, arose from case histories of warranty practices. Courts were asked
repeatedly to give effect to warranty provisions that they interpreted as
exploitative. In the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.," in-
volving serious personal injury from an allegedly defective automobile, the
terms of the warranty at issue disclaimed the implied warranty of
merchantability, excluded consequential damages, and limited warranty
remedies to repair or replacement of the defective part as long as the vic-
tim had prepaid transport charges for the part. The New Jersey Supreme
Court remarked, "It is difficult to imagine. . a less satisfactory remedy
... .An instinctively felt sense of justice cries out against such a sharp
bargain."3 In a decision that has been followed by virtually all other
American jurisdictions,36 the court embraced the exploitation theory and
refused to enforce the terms of the standardized warranty.
37
30. Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 405-06, 409, 412-13.
31. Id. at 410-11.
32. Kessler's essay, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, supra note 10, was particularly
influential.
33. Whitford, supra note 11, at 1039, 1062. Whitford also mentioned, however, that manufacturers
seemed to be concerned about maintaining consumer goodwill. Id. at 1016, 1040. But see id. at 1036
(dealer makes little effort to maintain goodwill of price shoppers). Whitford did not attempt to recon-
cile exploitative warranty practices with the concern for goodwill.
34. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
35. Id. at 375, 388, 161 A.2d at 79, 85.
36. See Prosser, supra note 20, at 793-98.
37. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 408, 161 A.2d 69, 97 (1960). The adop-
tion of the standard of strict liability for product defects is based upon the acceptance of the empirical
presumption of the exploitation theory: consumers are powerless in relation to manufacturers. James,
General Products-Should Manufacturers be Liable without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 925
(1951) (victims of accidents are not culpable; strict liability preferred over fault system where accidents
are inevitable); see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 170-72,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898, 900 (1964) (manufacturer strictly liable to consumer, regardless of contractual
provisions, because in business of selling automobiles that turn out to be defective); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (strict
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B. The Signal Theory
The signal theory of the consumer product warranty maintains that
warranty terms provide information to consumers about the mechanical
reliability of the product. 8 The signal theory builds upon a growing eco-
nomic literature that examines the "market" for information39 and views
the warranty as a tool consumers can use to "process" information about
products. According to the theory, a consumer finds it excessively costly to
determine precisely product reliability at the time of purchase by direct
inspection of the product."0 A consumer, however, may look to the war-
ranty as a "signal" of product reliability because reliability is correlated
negatively with the costs of warranty coverage;" that is, the more reliable
the product, the lower the costs of warranty coverage for the manufac-
turer, and the more extensive the coverage for the consumer. Thus, al-
though a consumer has neither experience with nor knowledge of a prod-
uct, he may infer its mechanical reliability by inspecting the terms of the
warranty alone.
Signals, however, only reduce information costs to consumers. Some
consumer misperception of product risks is inevitable.42 The extent of mis-
perception is determined by the costs and benefits to consumers of ob-
taining product information by means of warranty signals, which is to
say, by the utility of the warranty as an information-processing tool. The
implications of the theory for specific warranty practices are derived by
estimating the costs and benefits of processing information in the context
liability designed to protect "powerless" consumer). A strict liability regime presupposes the inappro-
priateness of allowing manufacturers to define liability by contract. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (contractual disclaimer of warranty of merchantability
and limitation of remedies invalid because of manufacturer's "grossly disproportionate bargaining
power").
38. An early statement of this theory was suggested in Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons':"
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
39. See Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961), reprinted in G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968).
40. Some degree of consumer ignorance was an important, but not central, assumption of the case
law, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 365, 375, 379, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 74,
78, 80-81, 84 (1960), and of the writings of the exploitation theorists, see, e.g., Kessler, supra note 9,
at 632; Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer under Modem Sales Law, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 262,
267-78 (1964); Leff, supra note 9, at 156; Prosser, supra note 28, at 1133. Professor Slawson, on the
other hand, believes that making standard form contracts understandable would hurt rather than help
consumers. Slawson, supra note 29, at 16-17 (consumers would not read or could not understand
standard form contracts even if they were made "understandable," but courts would not hesitate to
enforce such contracts).
41. A.M. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 88-90 (1974).
42. CF Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV.
ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1977) (presuming that consumers will misperceive likelihood of losses from
products). Spence recommends governmental fines to repair this form of market failure. Id. at 565-67.
Of course, the problem of product warranties is more interesting where consumers systematically
misperceive product risks-because the market mechanism requires correction-than where consum-
ers make estimates that are highly variant, but on average accurate.
1303
The Yale Law Journal
of specific consumer transactions.
The first implication of the signal theory is that warranties of different
products are likely to contain similar, if not identical, provisions. This
implication follows from the presumption that the more often a consumer
expects to buy a product, the greater the value is to him of information
about product characteristics. But since a consumer purchases any single
appliance or durable only occasionally, the benefit of obtaining warranty
information specific to a single appliance is small relative to the benefit of
compiling information common to a wide set of consumer goods.,3 Thus, a
manufacturer's warranty signal is more likely to be successful if it resem-
bles the warranty signals of other products. For this reason, the warranty
terms of different products should be similar, each taking advantage of the
greater benefit to consumers of general rather than of product-specific
information.
A second implication of the signal theory is that wherever warranty
terms diverge from the near-uniform standards of most warranties, the
divergent terms will offer coverage more generous-not more restric-
tive-than the uniform terms. According to the theory, upon the discovery
of a defect, a consumer acts on the basis of perceptions formed from gen-
eral information or experience regarding products. In particular, the con-
sumer presumes that the warranty terms of the specific product equal the
average terms of all other products."' Such perceptions, however, disad-
vantage manufacturers who offer less than average warranty coverage be-
cause their products are less reliable than the average. 5 For those defec-
tive products, consumers file warranty claims even though the warranties
do not extend coverage, thus imposing administrative expenses on the
manufacturers and costing them goodwill.4 ' Indeed, it may be cheaper for
those manufacturers to expand warranty coverage to the average level
than to process "invalid" claims.47 As a consequence, warranties that per-
sist in offering coverage different from the average should offer more gen-
erous rather than more restrictive coverage. 8
The third implication of the theory is that subordinate terms of a war-
ranty, as opposed to central terms, are more likely to diverge from the
norm and to offer relatively more restrictive coverage. The theory pro-
poses that a consumer benefits more from information relating to the cen-
43. See A.M. SPENCE, supra note 41, at 89; Gerner & Bryant, The Price of a Warranty: The
Case for Refrigerators, 12 J. CONSUMER AFF. 30, 32 (1978); Gerner & Bryant, Appliance Warranties
as a Market Signal? 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 75, 78-79 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Market Signal].
44. See Market Signal, supra note 43, at 78-79.





Vol. 90: 1297, 1981
Warranties
tral terms of a warranty than to subordinate terms."9 As a consequence,
the pressures leading toward uniform warranty provisions ought to have
greater effect with respect to central provisions than to subordinate provi-
sions.5 o In addition, since consumers are less aware of subordinate terms
(because the value of information about them is less), warranties are likely
to define subordinate terms more restrictively than average, because inva-
lid claims based upon perceptions of those terms will be rare.s"
Moreover, since consumers remain largely ignorant of the content of
subordinate provisions, normal competitive pressures are absent. Manu-
facturers will define those provisions with reference only to costs of cover-
age and not to consumer benefits. 2 At this point, the exploitation and
signal theories converge. Signal theorists expect competition to influence
the content of central warranty provisions, subject to information process-
ing costs.53 But, like the exploitation theorists, they expect subordinate
warranty provisions to be defined in a manner that disregards consumer
interests."'
The implications of the signal theory have been examined recently by
the economists Gerner and Bryant in an empirical study of the content of
108 warranties of washing machines, ranges, refrigerators, air condition-
ers, and televisions." Their findings offer mild support for the theory.
First, Gerner and Bryant report that most warranties provide coverage of
parts and labor costs for one year,5 a finding they interpret as confirma-
tion of the advantage of general over product-specific information. 7 Ex-
ceptions to even this basic term of coverage exist, however. For example,
only fifty percent of washing machine warranties provide one-year parts
coverage, and seventy-one percent of television warranties offer one-year
labor coverage. 8
Gerner and Bryant find less uniformity within the set of warranties
whose terms diverge from the basic one-year term. It is consistent with the
signal theory that warranties offering a different duration of parts cover-
49. See id. at 78-79 (by inference).
50. See id. at 79, 84 (by inference).
51. See id. at 79-85 (by inference).
52. See id. at 84-85 (by inference).
53. See id. at 79-86 (by inference).
54. See id. at 84-85 (by inference).
55. Their sample incorporates 90% of the models sold during the 1975 model year. Id. at 80.
56. This "finding" appears to be accurate only when the terms of coverage are defined very gener-
ally. See note 174 infra (discussing prevalence of one-year parts and labor coverage).
57. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 81-82.
58. Id. at 82 (Table 1). There are exceptions to the one-year term with respect to the other
appliances as well. Gerner and Bryant do not suggest that consumers of different products possess
different levels of information. Such an assumption would conflict with the prediction of generalized
warranty signals. As a consequence, however, the signal theory does not provide a basis for explaining
differences in the terms of warranties of different products. See pp. 1328-46 infra (examining differ-
ences in warranties).
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age provide only extended coverage; that is, coverage greater than the av-
erage. s9 The great majority of warranties that provide a different term of
labor coverage, however, restrict coverage below the average one-year
term."' Gerner and Bryant explain this difference by supposing that
manufacturers find it cheaper to monitor invalid labor claims than parts
claims and that manufacturers thus are more willing to suffer consumer
dissatisfaction where expensive labor costs are at stake."
Finally, as predicted by the theory, Gerner and Bryant find little uni-
formity in what they assume to be the warranties' subordinate terms: the
exclusions and limitations of coverage. 2 There is some evidence, in addi-
tion, that these exclusions are defined solely with reference to manufactur-
ers' costs. One example is the exclusion of consequential damages, which
they observe most frequently in refrigerator warranties. According to
Gerner and Bryant, refrigerators are more likely than other defective ap-
pliances to generate consequential damages in the form of food losses. 3
The signal theory has exerted substantial influence on consumer prod-
uct warranty policy. The objective of the 1974 Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act64 is to make warranties more efficient signals.6 The Act requires
manufacturers to redraft warranties in "simple and readily understood
language," 6 to disclose all important provisions "conspicuously," 7 and to
display warranties prominently so that they are available for consumer
inspection prior to purchase of the product. 8 The Act requires manufac-
turers to designate all express warranties as either "Full" (if they comply
with certain minimum standards) or "Limited" (if they do not comply
with those standards), in order to reduce the costs of comprehending war-
ranty content. 9 The drafters hoped that the pressures toward greater than
59. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 79-80, 81-82 (Table 1).
60. Id. at 82-83.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 84-85 (Table 3).
63. Id. at 85.
64. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act §§ 101-112, 88
Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976)).
65. See H. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7702, 7718 (conspicuous and clear disclosure required under § 102(a) of Act in order "to
improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competi-
tion in the marketing of consumer products"); Priest, The Structure and Operation of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IN THE 1970S at 246 (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981) (discussing theory of Act).
66. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 102(a), 15
U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1976).
67. Id. §§ 102(a), 103(a), 105, 106, 108(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2303(a), 2305, 2306, 2308(b)
(1976).
68. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (1976). Kessler emphasized the advantage to
manufacturers of warranties with obscure printing and language. Kessler, supra note 10, at 9.
69. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act §§ 103-104, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2303-2304 (1976).
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average coverage would lead to universal compliance with Full warranty
standards.
70
The Act's disclosure, availability, and designation requirements, how-
ever, affect only the central provisions of warranties. Subordinate provi-
sions, which, according to the theory, consumers are less likely to compre-
hend, are subjected to direct regulation. The Act prohibits disclaimers of
the implied warranties for all warranties, 71 and expands consumer reme-
dies and prohibits tying provisions for Full warranties. 2
II. The Investment Theory of the Warranty
In this Part I develop a theory of the consumer product warranty based
solely upon the relative costs to the consumer and manufacturer of invest-
ments to prolong productive capacity and to insure for product losses. I
then define how warranty contracts are likely to be drafted in cases in
which contract standardization reduces costs.
A. The Basic Theory Defined
Let us relax the empirical assumptions that are the foundations of the
signal and exploitation theories in order to predict the contents of warran-
ties where the costs of extending product life and of insuring product
losses are the sole determinants of their contents. Imagine that consumers
are perfectly informed about the likelihood of a product defect and about
the losses that will be suffered should a product become defective. Imagine
also that consumers somehow make their preferences regarding warranty
terms known to manufacturers7" and that manufacturers are responsive to
those preferences. Imagine that warranty contracts are standardized only
to reduce negotiation costs74 and thus that the standardized form itself
does not affect the substantive obligations of consumers relative to manu-
facturers.75 Finally, imagine that all products are manufactured under
conditions of perfect competition, so that each characteristic of a prod-
70. See S. REP. NO. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973); 120 CONG. REC. 40,712 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Magnuson).
71. Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 108, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2308 (1976). A manufacturer offering a Limited, rather than Full, warranty, however, may disclaim
the implied warranties for the period after expiration of the warranty. Id.
72. Id. § 102(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (1976). Other subordinate provisions have been regulated
under the Act by Federal Trade Commission rule. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 700-703 (1980).
73. See pp. 1346-47 infra (discussing how consumer preferences may be registered).
74. Kessler acknowledged the cost savings from standardization. Kessler, supra note 10, at 12.
75. This assumption is not unrealistic and is accepted generally with respect to a wide range of
product characteristics. Anyone, for example, could arrange to purchase appliances with characteris-
tics designed to personal specifications. Most, however, seem willing to accept machines with standard
characteristics, designed to be generally suitable for the large majority of consumers, in order to take
advantage of the cost savings.
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uct-including warranty terms-serves to optimize the welfare of some
dominant class of consumers.7 6 What would be the terms of product
warranties?
In the common view, a warranty serves as both an insurance policy and
a repair contract. As an insurance policy, a warranty provides that if,
within a certain period, the product or some part of the product becomes
defective, the manufacturer will compensate the buyer for the loss by re-
pair, replacement, or refund of the purchase price." As a repair contract,
a warranty fixes an obligation upon the manufacturer for some period of
time to provide, without charge, services necessary to repair a defect in
order to prolong the useful capacity of the product.
A warranty operates as an insurance policy to the extent that the occur-
rence of a product defect is probabilistic. To insure for a loss is to redis-
tribute wealth from periods in which no losses are suffered to the period
in which the loss occurs. A manufacturer can redistribute wealth in this
manner by collecting a premium in the sale price from a broad set of
consumers for whom the prospects of loss during any single period are
unrelated. The market insurance premium reflects both the expected loss
for the period and some share of the costs to the insurer of aggregating
these unrelated contingencies, called loading costs. A consumer may pre-
fer, however, some personal form of temporal wealth redistribution in the
face of a loss. A consumer self-insures for product losses by accumulating
savings for the replacement of defective products, by reserving future time
for product repair, or, more simply, by expecting to tolerate a defect once
it occurs. These methods of self-insurance, of course, also involve costs of
transaction. As a general proposition, therefore, we may expect to observe
market insurance in a warranty only where the sum of the expected loss
and loading costs of market insurance is less than the sum of the expected
loss and transaction costs of self-insurance.
As a repair contract, a warranty reflects the respective costs to the con-
sumer and the manufacturer of repair services. Repair by the consumer
and manufacturer are substitutes, and the consumer can be expected to
purchase repair services as part of the warranty wherever the manufac-
turer's price is less than the consumer's cost of providing the repair him-
self. Obviously, a consumer can (and frequently does) provide many re-
pair services more cheaply than a manufacturer. It is plausible, for
example, that where shelves fall in a refrigerator, repair by the consumer
76. Because of the standardized form, contracts are not specific to individuals but rather to classes
of consumers.
77. I ignore, at this point, personal injury losses from defective products for which product war-
rarities, partly because of acceptance of the exploitation theory, currently are irrelevant. See note 37
supra. The investment theory is extended to consider personal injury liability below. See pp. 1350-51
infra.
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is cheaper. Of course, since the consumer and manufacturer are always
free after the purchase of the good to negotiate for the provision of services
of this kind, the warranty itself is valuable only if it reduces transaction
costs for future agreements. Thus, a warranty may be expected to allocate
responsibility to the manufacturer for those types of repairs that most fre-
quently are difficult or burdensome for consumers to provide themselves.
Although the above example, as well as most uses of the word "repair,"
refers to investments designed to return a product to a condition it enjoyed
at some previous period of time, it is worthwhile to consider "repair ser-
vice" to a product more broadly as any investment designed to optimize
the performance of the product over time. Viewed in this light, for exam-
ple, restraining young children from swinging on a refrigerator door rep-
resents an investment in a form of "repair" that may well be less costly
than hiring a serviceman at a later date to install new hinges. Similarly, a
manufacturer may anticipate future repair services by technological in-
vestments in the design of the product that make its operation less suscep-
tible to interruption-designing brackets to hold refrigerator shelves more
securely, for example-or by investments to control a consistent quality of
production.
With respect to repair investments of this nature, however, a warranty
serves a role beyond that of reducing transaction costs. The warranty
promise establishes and enforces the obligation of the manufacturer to
make investments in the design of the good or in quality control. Such an
agreement between the parties subsequent to the sale could not achieve the
same result as easily,"8 so that there are advantages to "tying" the war-
ranty to the sale of the product."9 The warranty in this regard operates as
a performance bond of the manufacturer. 0 The value of the bond is equal
to the costs to the manufacturer of defective product claims.81 As long as
78. The terms of subsequent repair agreements preferred by consumers might influence product
design to the extent that they provide the basis for the consumers' repeat purchase decisions. See p.
1347 infra.
79. The advantage of tying the warranty to the product diminishes, however, to the extent that a
manufacturer seeks to capture repeat purchase sales. See note 199 infra. The desire for future custom
alone will provide an incentive for optimal manufacturer investments. See generally Klein & Leffler,
The Role of Price in Guaranteeing Quality, 89 J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 1981) (discussing repeat
purchase mechanism).
80. See Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & ECON. 291,
303 n.26 (1977). As an independent example of the warranty's role as a performance bond, the Wil-
bert burial vault warranty (not included in the sample analyzed below, see pp. 1319-46 infra) pro-
vides 50-year coverage against deterioration. Because of the extraordinary duration of coverage, the
warranty informs the buyer that the manufacturer has established a trust fund in the amount not less
than $25,000 for the payment of warranty claims, "in the event the Manufacturer is no longer in
business." I am grateful to J.H. Schlegal for this observation.
81. The signal theory, similarly, presumes that a warranty signal is credible because the manufac-
turer will incur the costs of coverage. See p. 1303 supra (discussing negative correlation between
warranty coverage and reliability). The signal theory, however, views consumer information as a more
significant determinant of warranty content than costs.
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the manufacturer makes appropriate investments, the bond will not be
forfeited. The decision to allocate repair investments of this nature be-
tween the manufacturer and consumer, however, is identical to the deci-
sion of who should bear typical repair costs. As before, we would expect
the parties to allocate between themselves, according to relative costs, all
investments in "repair," whether in the form of direct reconditioning ser-
vices, of product design, or of a consumer's care for or maintenance of the
product so as to extend its useful life.
It is evident that the various activities described as repair are substitutes
for insurance. Repair, like insurance, is a means of reducing the magni-
tude of a loss from an unexpected event such as a defect. It is important
now, however, to depart from the common view of the warranty and to
distinguish more clearly between repair as a redistribution of wealth over
time, like insurance, and repair as an allocative investment which alters
the productive capacity of the good.82 The first example of repair-the
reinstallation of the refrigerator shelves by the consumer-is a form of
self-insurance for the loss. The owner bears the full cost of time and en-
ergy necessary to replace the shelves after the event occurs, which, in this
case, appears to be cheaper than buying market insurance requiring the
manufacturer to replace the shelves. But neither repair by the consumer
nor by the manufacturer directly alters the probability of the loss occur-
ring and, thus, is like insurance. The second example-restraining the
child from swinging on the refrigerator door-is an allocative investment
by a consumer that extends the useful life of the product by reducing the
probability of a future loss. Certainly, the burdens of a parent increase as
the discipline of children becomes more strict or specific. But, again, it
may well be cheaper for a consumer to restrain his child than either to
buy market insurance for repair of the door or to pay the manufacturer to
design a refrigerator with hinges as sturdy as playground equipment.
Thus, in this terminology, a consumer's decision to accommodate him-
self to a scratch in the surface of an appliance is an example of self-
insurance of the defect. The consumer's earlier efforts to reduce the likeli-
hood of the scratch, for example, by increasing the level of his care or by
isolating the appliance, is an allocative investment by the consumer. The
manufacturer's promise in a warranty to repair the scratch after it occurs
is market insurance. And the manufacturer's production decision to make
the surface more resistant to abrasion is an example of an allocative in-
vestment by the manufacturer.
Self-insurance, market insurance, and ailocative investments by con-
82. Ehrlich & Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON.
623, 633-43 (1972).
1310
Vol. 90: 1297, 1981
Warranties
sumers and manufacturers, therefore, are each substitute methods of re-
ducing losses in order to optimize productive services. A consumer selects
among these methods according to the relative prices and marginal
productivities of each with respect to expected elements of product loss. As
the price of market insurance rises, other things equal, the quantity of it
demanded will decline, and the demand for self-insurance and for manu-
facturer or consumer allocative investments will increase. Similarly, as the
cost of an allocative investment by the consumer rises-say, in our second
example, by the addition of a child to the consumer's family, which makes
it more difficult to reduce the probability of loss-the relative attractive-
ness of market insurance, self-insurance, or an allocative investment by
the manufacturer is enhanced. These various ways of reducing product
losses, however, may not be perfect substitutes. An individual is likely to
select some combination of these four methods to optimize expected util-
ity. 3 For example, as the value of a consumer product or of the con-
sumer's life increases-and, as a result, the potential risk from a defect
increases-the consumer may increase consumption of each of the four. 4
Most discussions of product defects in the economics literature" and
most legal decisions involving warranties' regard the probability of loss
from a defect as inherent in the nature of the product and independent of
actions of the consumer. According to this approach, allocative investments
by a consumer which serve-to reduce the probability of losses are nonexis-
tent, and the only relevant consumer and public policy choice is between
consumer self-insurance and manufacturer liability, whether leading to an
allocative investment or insurance.87 Often these analyses are qualified by
a reference to consumer behavior, although seldom by more than an ac-
knowledgement that in some cases a consumer may actively misuse a
83. Of course, a consumer may choose different methods to optimize the value of different charac-
teristics of a product-that is, he may select market insurance for the motor, but self-insurance for
scratches-so that some combination of the four methods in the purchase and use of any single con-
sumer product is likely to be observed.
84. This proposition assumes that income effects are held constant.
85. See, e.g., A.M. SPENCE, supra note 41, at 88; Brown, supra note 5, at 149; Heal, Guarantees
and Risk-Sharing, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 549, 550 (1977). But see J.P. Brown, The Perverse Effect of
Guarantees on Maintenance by Buyers 14-17 (June 1976) (manuscript, Cornell University) (discuss-
ing disincentives to consumer maintenance created by product guarantees) (on file with Yale Law
Journa).
86. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (consumers of defective products "powerless to protect themselves").
87. When the problem is characterized in this way, the appropriate legal standard is obviously
strict liability of the manufacturer; that is, except where there is reason to believe that consumer self-
insurance is optimal, a standard of strict liability leads the manufacturer to select between investments
to prevent loss and insurance. See, e.g., James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law,
63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 780 (1950) (government and large companies in position to reduce accidents;
individual's conscious free choice has insignificant effect on occurrence of accidents); Morris, supra
note 1, at 583-99 (arguing for enterprise liability because enterprises better able to spread risks).
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product." The implicit conclusion of each of these discussions is that allo-
cative investments by a consumer are empirically unimportant to the op-
timization of the productive life of the good. "9
Of course, there is no theoretical justification for disregarding allocative
investments by consumers. A more important implication of the theory,
however, is that there is no meaningful way to consider a product defect
independently of a consumer's allocative investments. Investments to re-
duce the probability of losses may take very subtle forms. I have alluded
earlier to the control of children and the placement of an appliance-as it
affects the number of times the appliance is scratched or jarred-as repre-
senting allocative investments. As a more general proposition, however,
two forms of investment by consumers will affect the likelihood of defects
in any consumer product. The first is the consumer's selection of a prod-
uct suitable for his expected needs. Warranty claims are likely to be more
frequent, for example, where a washing machine is undersized or a vac-
uum cleaner underpowered, or where there occurs some unexpected in-
crease in the demands that the consumer makes on the product. If the
consumer accurately anticipates his uses, and if he selects a product
designed most appropriately for those uses, the productive capacity of the
good is more likely to be preserved.9 The second form of investment is the
consumer's decision about the extent to which he will use the product. A
consumer who operates an appliance infrequently may be said to be pre-
serving the life of the product by choosing to store rather than to use it.
Initially, this conception may seem foreign because it is common to in-
fer from personal experience some "normal" use of a product. Indeed, the
law requires judges and juries to make inferences of "normal" use by
implying in product sales a warranty of merchantability that a product is
"of fair average quality" and is "fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used."9" If it were possible to infer some "normal" use of a
good, then the decision of an individual consumer to use or not to use the
good would be analytically irrelevant.
But preferences regarding the frequency of use of a product differ
among consumers. The preferences of the particular set of consumers for
whom the product has been designed in order to optimize sales cannot be
determined by inference. Where the dominant set of purchasers operates
the good infrequently and, thus, where the "normal" use of the good is
88. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 42, at 566 & n.5.
89. Of course, this presumption is critical both to the exploitation theory and to the theory of
enterprise liability. See notes 37 & 87 supra; James & Dickinson, supra note 87, at 780.
90. See Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 82, at 624, 637-43.
91. Thus a consumer can influence even the relationship between the rate of defects and product
design.
92. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b), (c).
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storage, the level of the consumers' allocative investments in preservation
of the product is high. 3 As a consequence, the level of the manufacturer's
allocative investment in product design or in insurance that optimizes pro-
ductive services may be very low. In such a case, the design or manner of
production of the product may be optimal even though the product ap-
pears grossly defective when operated with greater frequency, which is to
say, when operated with lower allocative investments in care by
consumers.
A warranty in this view is the instrument that expresses consumer pref-
erences for allocative or insurance investments. It is a contract that divides
responsibility for allocative investments and insurance between the con-
sumer and the manufacturer. The content of the contract is determined by
the respective costs to the two parties of allocative investments or insur-
ance. According to this approach, a manufacturer makes investments to
prolong product life up to the point at which the marginal cost of such
investments equals the marginal benefit. A manufacturer, then, offers
market insurance for those losses or items of service for which market
insurance is less costly than insurance or allocative investments by the
consumer himself.
To the extent that a manufacturer disclaims liability or excludes or lim-
its warranty coverage, however, it shifts to the consumer the obligation to
make allocative investments to preserve the product or to self-insure for its
loss. A disclaimer or an exclusion of coverage is the functional equivalent
of provisions, common in other contracts, that explicitly require one of the
parties to take certain actions to prevent breach or to insure for losses
from uncertain events. The theory predicts that disclaimers of liability and
exclusions of coverage will be observed in consumer product warranties
for those specific allocative or insurance investments that the consumer can
provide more cheaply than the manufacturer. In this view, disclaimers
and exclusions can be said to be demanded by consumers because of the
relative cheapness of consumer allocative investments or of self-insurance.
B. A Note on Moral Hazard
This discussion of the factors leading to an optimal division between the
consumer and the manufacturer of allocative and insurance investments is
identical conceptually to the problem of moral hazard which has been dis-
cussed extensively in insurance literature, in particular, in the context of
medical insurance." Following Arrow and Pauly, the usual approach to
93. Put another way, the reduced frequency of defects is attributable to the choice of consumers to
forgo use of the machine.
94. See, e.g., Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251
(1973); Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); Rosett & Huang, The Effect of
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the problem is to regard the existence of insurance itself as encouraging
the purchaser to use too much of the good or service that the insurance
supplies.95 Thus, an individual who would purchase a certain amount of
medical care when charged the marginal cost of the care, demands a
greater amount of care if fully insured. Full insurance reduces the price of
future purchases to zero, and leads the individual to a socially "excessive"
level of consumption, a result said to illustrate the "moral hazard" of
insurance.96
Moral hazard in the context of health insurance has been shown to
represent a shift from ex ante allocative investments in care toward ex
post investments in medical services which, given insurance, cost less at
the margin." Thus, medical insurance diminishes the individual's margi-
nal incentive to invest in the preservation of his health. In general, how-
ever, moral hazard will appear in every context in which the investments
or actions of the insured affect the probability of loss. The moral hazard
problem is resolved, as in the investment analysis of warranties, by an ex
ante definition of the insurance contract according to the relative costs of
preservation (allocative investments) and of insurance.98
C. Defining Standardized Contracts: Reducing Differences in Risks
The task of defining optimal warranty provisions" resembles the task of
defining optimal rate classes in insurance contracts. In all insurance con-
texts, it is advantageous for an insurer to segregate applicants according to
the level of risks added to the insurance pool. If the risk of loss of an
individual can be predicted, then the insurance premium can be tailored to
reflect the likelihood of future payouts. In particular, insurance coverage
can be offered at a lower premium to an individual for whom the risk of
loss is relatively low.
For most types of insurance, of course, it is prohibitively costly either to
Health Insurance on the Demand for Medical Care, 81 J. POL. ECON. 281 (1973).
95. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,
961-62 (1963); Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 532-35
(1968).
96. This formulation is taken from Pauly, supra note 95, at 535.
97. See Rosett & Huang, supra note 94, at 298.
98. See Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 82, at 641-43 (explaining reduction of moral hazard). The
moral hazard literature raises the optimization question from the standpoint of the seller of insurance
rather than the buyer. The content of product warranties might be analyzed in this mannef by asking
how a manufacturer selects the elements and level of coverage by observation of product sales. The
analytical solution is identical: the manufacturer declines to extend coverage where the costs of cover-
age exceed the benefits to consumers because of the substitution by consumers away from less costly
investments in prevention or self-insurance.
99. I assume in the following discussion that the standardization of warranties reduces the joint
costs of contract formation of the manufacturer and consumer, an uncontroversial assumption. See
note 74 supra.
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predict exactly the risk that an individual brings to a pool or to charge
individual premiums. As a consequence, an insurer is forced to lump indi-
viduals into separate classes or, sometimes, into a single class. The pre-
mium charged each member of the class must reflect the average level of
risk of the class. Thus, the premium undercharges relatively high-risk in-
dividuals and overcharges relatively low-risk individuals. At the margin,
some low-risk individuals are likely to find that the cost of market insur-
ance exceeds the benefit, and will shift to allocative investments that re-
duce the likelihood of the loss or to self-insurance. In the context of con-
sumer products, these individuals will shift their purchases to products
sold without, or with less, warranty coverage. The more precisely the in-
surer is able to construct classes comprising individuals with relatively
similar levels of risk, however, the smaller the discrepancy will be be-
tween the premium and the value of insurance to the lower risk members
of the pool. Thus, the lower risk members become less inclined to substi-
tute self-insurance for market insurance. As a general proposition, there-
fore, discrimination that reduces differences in risk between members of a
given insurance class optimizes the sale of insurance.
It is common for life, medical, accident, and home insurers to obtain
information about applicants prior to making contracts in order to place
applicants in appropriate insurance classes. Insurers routinely solicit in-
formation about age, sex, property location and value, as well as medical
records and driving histories in order to construct rate classes. 00 Some
insurers make it possible for individuals with characteristics that tend to
be correlated with low levels of risk, such as abstemious smoking and
drinking habits, to identify themselves in order to qualify for lower premi-
ums. Analogues to these methods of discrimination, however, are not im-
mediately apparent in the context of consumer product insurance. Typi-
cally, insurance policies for consumer product losses are tied to the sale of
the product itself, so that the insurance pool invariably consists of all con-
sumers who have purchased the product.
Consumers may differ in two general ways with respect to risk under a
product warranty. First, the amount of use of a product during the period
of warranty coverage may vary considerably between consumers. Com-
pare, for example, the expected service costs to a washing machine manu-
facturer from a family with many children and from a family with only a
single child. The costs of service to the large family will almost certainly
be greater. If the manufacturer could define warranty coverage in terms of
number of washloads, however, as an automobile manufacturer defines
100. The information on which the medical or accident insurer relies, of course, is frequently a
by-product of the activities of other industries, such as the rendering of medical diagnosis or the
administration of the traffic laws.
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coverage in terms of mileage, then the expected costs from the two families
to the manufacturer might be similar. But for washing machines, as well
as for most other consumer appliances, the least costly measure of use
appears to be duration of ownership. As a consequence, no matter what
the period of coverage, the amount of use of the machine by the two fami-
lies is likely to differ greatly. The insurance premium must be set to cover
all expected costs of service. Thus, smaller families at the margin may
find warranty protection to be worth less than its cost.
Second, the risk of loss may differ between consumers with respect to
what I will call the "intensity" of product use. Compare now for the large
and small families, the expected service costs to a television manufacturer.
The amount of use of the television-that is, the number of viewing
hours-might be identical for the two families. Nonetheless, the
probability of a warranty claim is likely to be higher for the larger family,
because of the greater number of individuals operating the set, because of
the greater frequency of channel changes, and because of the greater risk
in a large family that the set will be jostled, that the antenna will be
struck, or that the machine will otherwise be treated roughly.
I define "intensity" of use as inversely related to the marginal cost to
the consumer of "care" for the machine, 1 ' that is, the cost of allocative
investments to reduce the probability of a loss. The cost of monitoring the
activities of children is likely to increase as the number of children in-
creases. Thus, the family with many children is more likely than the fam-
ily with a single child to substitute recovery under a warranty for alloca-
tive investments in care of the machine. As a consequence, the cost to the
manufacturer of warranty coverage will be greater for the machine sold to
the larger family. Again, at the margin, consumers with smaller families
may find it advantageous to shift their purchases to machines sold with-
out, or with less, warranty coverage.
Although product insurers do not directly acquire information about
consumers prior to sale, a variety of subtle methods can enable them to
segregate consumers. For example, a manufacturer can develop models of
a product that differ with respect to characteristics related to differences in
intensities or amounts of consumer use. A manufacturer of washing ma-
chines may produce models that differ in motor size or washbasket volume
that are differentially convenient to families of different sizes. If these
product characteristics segregate consumers according to the extent or in-
tensity of use, then the manufacturer can offer, for each individual model,
101. The distinction between "intensity" and amount of use corresponds to the distinction in eco-
nomics between movements along a cost (supply) curve and movements of the cost curve with respect
to different scales of operation. See J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 115-18 (2d
ed. 1980).
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different allocative investments and levels of warranty coverage deter-
mined by the expected warranty claims for each model.
This technique, however, may achieve only partial success. The advan-
tage to a manufacturer of culling out higher intensity or higher volume
consumers from a particular insurance pool is to enable it to offer war-
ranty coverage at a relatively lower premium, or greater coverage at the
same premium, of models designed for lower volume or intensity uses. A
lower premium or more extended coverage, however, makes those ma-
chines relatively more attractive to all consumers, including those who ex-
pect to use the machine with greater intensity or in higher volume. At the
margin, some of these consumers can be expected to purchase machines
undersized for their needs. Such purchases substitute the extended war-
ranty coverage of the lower volume machine for the mechanical superior-
ity of the higher volume machine. This adverse selection by higher volume
or intensity consumers will force manufacturers to reduce the extended
coverage of the lower volume machine or to charge a higher premium for
it. Either reaction will reduce the attractiveness of the lower volume ma-
chine to the lower risk members of the pool.102
A separate but closely related method of segregating consumers is to
offer warranty contracts with different terms at different premiums in
conjunction with the sale of a given product. Recently, the domestic auto-
mobile manufacturers have introduced insurance policies for separate fees
extending coverage for periods beyond the basic twelve-month warranty.0
3
The optional service contract of many appliances is similar. These con-
tracts segregate consumers according to the amount of insurance coverage
they wish to buy.1" 4 The warranty provides a term of basic coverage de-
manded by the lowest risk members of the pool. Those consumers for
whom the risk is greater, however, can purchase more extensive coverage.
Because relatively high-risk consumers are more likely to select such con-
tracts, their premiums are likely to be proportionally higher for a given
duration of coverage than the premiums of the basic warranty included in
the sale price. 05
A more subtle method of differentiating consumers is the offer by many
retailers of warranty coverage that is separate from and, typically, more
102. This discussion is similar to that of Akerlof, supra note 38, at 492-93. Akerlof, however,
focuses in his principal illustration upon the technological characteristics of a product rather than
upon differential product use by consumers.
103. Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
104. See Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard
and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44, 60 (1974); Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competi-
tive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629,
641-42 (1976).
105. See Pauly, supra note 104, at 60.
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extensive than the coverage offered by the product manufacturers them-
selves."0 6 This additional coverage need not be explicit. It may take the
form only of a more liberal or courteous return or exchange policy. It is
not uncommon, however, for retailers to announce and, thus, to make con-
tractual a guarantee of consumer "satisfaction"'0 7 that far exceeds the typ-
ical manufacturer warranty. This practice enables consumers to segregate
themselves according to the level of protection each desires. Those con-
sumers who value their time highly and who avoid allocative investments
in care and maintenance or insurance investments in self-repair of prod-
ucts, may seek out retailers with liberal policies, although the products
can be purchased at lower retail prices elsewhere. Dealers who offer more
extensive warranty coverage are undoubtedly fully compensated for doing
so, but their customers are less likely to to be those for whom the costs of
allocative investments or self-insurance are relatively low.
Finally, a manufacturer may segregate consumers by means of explicit
contractual provisions in the warranty. A manufacturer, for example, may
exclude warranty coverage for a particular use of a product or specific
class of consumers for which the volume or intensity of use is relatively
high. The common provision that excludes coverage of commercial use is
an obvious example. This provision narrows the class of those insured to
domestic users of the product and may be incorporated to enforce a manu-
facturer's segregation of domestic and commercial purchasers by model
design.
Some elements of product loss, however, may be excluded from coverage
in the warranties of all product models. A common example is the exclu-
sion of liability for consequential damages. The unavailability of any cov-
erage of some loss, nonetheless, may be related to the reduction of differ-
ences in risk between members of the insurance pool. Where consumers
differ substantially in the incidence or magnitude of a loss, such as conse-
quential damages, there may be no single premium attractive to a suffi-
cient number to justify offering coverage. Put another way, the increase in
the premium required for coverage of such losses may be greater than the
benefit of coverage to large numbers of consumers. If so, the sale of prod-
uct insurance may be optimized by excluding coverage altogether.
Warranty exclusions are a form of product standardization. An exclu-
sion of some element of loss is indistinguishable analytically from the ex-
clusion of, say, magenta and acquamarine as product colors. If the num-
ber of consumers willing to purchase machines of unusual colors is very
small, it may not be worth the cost for the manufacturer to introduce the
106. See Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAW & SoC'y REV.
199, 207, 211 (1978) (retailer studied offered coverage far more extensive than any manufacturer).
107. See id. at 211-12 (discussing Sears, Roebuck guarantee).
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colors into the product line. Similarly, if the incidence or magnitude of an
element of loss differs greatly between consumers of a product, the market
for insurance may not be sufficiently large to justify offering insurance.
Such a warranty exclusion enables the manufacturer to offer, for losses
not excluded, either more extensive or less costly warranty coverage than
if no exclusion were made, just as the production of appliances in a lim-
ited range of colors lowers price by reducing the costs of production and
distribution. In this respect, consumers of the product may be said to have
demanded the exclusions.
The segregation of consumers by explicit contractual provisions, how-
ever, is effective only to the extent that the manufacturer can identify
prior to sale those consumers, product uses, or elements of loss for which
differences in risk across the set of potential consumers are great. All those
not identified and segregated must be lumped into a common pool, high-
risk and low-risk alike. The terms of the standard warranty, then, estab-
lish the minimum level of coverage that is demanded uniformly by each
member of the large class of purchasers; that is, a base level that can be
supplemented in the variety of ways suggested above by those consumers
desiring more extensive protection. The standard level of coverage com-
prises the minimum performance bond necessary to encourage appropriate
investments by manufacturers in the design or mechanical qualities of the
product and the minimum insurance coverage demanded by the lowest
risk members of the consumer pool. t°1
III. An Empirical Examination of the Theories
This Part evaluates whether the exploitation, signal, or investment the-
ory best explains the content of consumer product warranties by reviewing
the provisions of warranties issued in 1974 of sixty-two consumer prod-
ucts comprising sixteen different product groups."' 9 The sample warran-
ties were taken from a wide range of consumer products, including house-
hold appliances such as refrigerators, ranges, washers, dryers, and
108. Yoram Barzel suggests, as part of a general theory of measurement costs, that the duration of
warranty coverage will be that period sufficient to allow the consumer to discover latent defects where
inspection is cheaper for the consumer than for the manufacturer. Y. Barzel, Measurement Cost and
the Organization of Markets (July 1979) (manuscript, University of Washington) (on file with Yale
Law Journal). Others have expressed a more limited version of this theory. See Bogert & Fink, supra
note 6, at 403; Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of
Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV 701, 702
(1977). Because there are no readily available means of measuring consumers' inspection costs, this
theory cannot account-except by definition-for differences in warranty duration.
109. The warranties were compiled by the Federal Trade Commission for a study of the effects of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See J. SCHMITT, L. KANTER, & R. MILLER, IMPACT REPORT ON
THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (STAFF REPORT) 11 (1980). The warranties surveyed in this article were issued in 1974,
prior to the enactment of the Warranty Act.
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televisions, relatively inexpensive products such as cookware, and more
significant durables such as automobiles, recreational vehicles,"10 and on-
site mobile homes.1"'
For this study I have inspected only copies of the warranties; I have
collected no information regarding the frequency or magnitude of war-
ranty claims of individual products or of warranty practices of manufac-
turers. A comparison of warranty terms alone, however, cannot provide
sufficient grounds to accept or reject any of the theories. The investment
theory, in particular, implies a precise relationship among price, cost, and
warranty coverage, which I cannot examine. The results of the survey
nevertheless are highly suggestive and support, I believe, more detailed
empirical work.
A. Direct Tests of the Exploitation and Signal Theories
This subpart examines the exploitation theory by comparing warranty
coverage to measures of manufacturer power, and the signal theory by
comparing warranty duration to estimates of the service life of various
products.
1. The Exploitation Theory: Warranty Coverage and Manufacturer
Market Power
According to the exploitation theory, manufacturers exercise their pow-
erful market position by imposing one-sided warranty terms on weaker
consumers. Although some discussions treat the bargaining position of all
manufacturers as superior to that of consumers, ' 2 most consider the size
of the manufacturer crucial, so that warranties less favorable to consumers
are offered by the larger rather than the smaller firms within an indus-
try."' Still other treatments describe manufacturer market power as a
110. There are four leisure vehicles represented in the warranty sample. "Travel trailers" are
large units (often with kitchens and bedrooms) towed behind a principal vehicle. "Recreational vehi-
cles" (Type A Motor Homes) are large, self-propelled motor homes (often with kitchens and side-
beds). "Coaches" (Type C Motor Homes) consist of a normal auto van chassis and cab to which is
attached a relatively small living area (with beds and kitchen). "Truck mounts" are camping units
attached to the bed of a pick-up truck.
111. The sample was not randomly drawn, but includes warranties of both dominant and rela-
tively insignificant firms within the various industries. See p. 1321 infra (Table 1). The warranties of
this sample represent a broader set of products than those of the Gerner and Bryant sample, see
Market Signal, supra note 43, at 80 (household appliances only), but are less inclusive. The Gerner
and Bryant sample contained at least eighteen warranties of each of five products. The provisions of
the warranties of my sample appear very similar to those of both the Gerner and Bryant sample and
the sample in Bogert & Fink, supra note 6, at 403-09 (describing sample). But see p. 1337 infra
(apparent differences between Gerner and Bryant sample and this sample with respect to original
purchaser limitation).
112. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 29, at 2.
113. A recent study compared warranty content with manufacturer size as measured by annual
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consequence of the absence of competition, whether because of monopoli-
zation or of express or tacit collusion." 4 Thus, although a firm is large, its
warranty practices may be constrained by competition with a group of
small firms.
A principal weakness of the exploitation theory is that it provides no
theoretical link between market power and product warranty terms. Why
would a firm with market power maximize its returns by offering one-
sided warranty terms rather than by manufacturing shoddy goods or by
charging a monopoly price? Generally, monopoly profits are maximized
by selling a product identical in all respects (except price) to the product
offered under competition."' 5 Thus, in theory, a monopolist (or a group of
conspiring firms) will gain the greatest return by offering the consumer an
optimal warranty, but at a price that exceeds marginal costs.
Table 1 tests the exploitation hypothesis empirically. It compares in-
dividual firm power in appliance markets with the content of each firm's
warranty. Columns (2) through (10) array individual manufacturers ac-
cording to each firm's share of the sales of a single appliance. The rows
describe the content of each firm's warranty for the appliance, including
the duration of basic and extended parts and labor coverage and the major
exclusions and limitations of liability. The exploitation theory implies that
the larger a firm's market share, the more restrictive the terms of its war-
ranty will be.
Table 1 offers little support for the exploitation theory. The basic parts
coverage of the firms with larger market shares is similar to that of firms
with smaller market shares, although two relatively small firms offer un-
usually long coverage-five years (columns (7) and (9)). Moreover, the
extended parts coverage of the smaller firms appears less generous than
sales volume in dollars. Note, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 1117, 1141-44 (1979). As a measure of size, dollar sales volume alone fails to distinguish
between firms producing differently priced products. Thus, for example, a dominant manufacturer of
cookware may appear less significant than a relatively small manufacturer of on-site mobile homes.
The study found that manufacturers with relatively larger sales volumes offered the more generous
warranty terms. Id. at 1141-42.
114. This was Kessler's view. Kessler, supra note 9, at 632; see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390-91, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960) (three auto manufacturers using identical
warranties had 93.5% share of market).
115. Sales in any market are maximized by the offer of product characteristics that are most
responsive to consumer demands. See Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 548-85 (1969); Swan, Optimum Durability, Second-Hand Markets, and Planned Obsoles-
cence, 80 J. POL. ECON. 575, 577, 582 (1972). It is possible that warranty provisions could be em-
ployed to enable discrimination in prices to increase profits further. Product warranties, however, tend
to exclude from coverage high- rather than low-intensity users. See pp. 1330-46 infra. High-intensity
users are usually those for whom the costs of the substitutes for warranty coverage-the consumer's
allocative or insurance investments-are relatively high. Consumers who face costly substitutes, how-
ever, are the principal targets of price discrimination. Thus, the profit-maximizing discriminatory
tactic would seek to include high-intensity users in the warranty pool, and to charge them a price that
exploits the relative difficulty of substitution, rather than to exclude them.
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Table 1. Warranty Coverage and Firm Market Share by Number of Firms,
for Selected Appliances,* 1974
Warranty Provision' (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Percent Market Share by Product
2  
Insignif-
>20 18-19 12-13 10-11 8-9 6-7 4-5 <3 icant'
N 2 2 2 I 2 4 2 8 7
Basic Parts 1 1 2 1 I 2 3 2 6 6
Coverage (years) 2 1 1 1 1
5 1 1
Extended Parts 0 1 1 1 2 1
Coverage (years) 2 1 1 I 1 1
5 1 21 1 1 2t 1 6 5
Basic Labor 0 1 1 1 1
Coverage (years) 1 1 1 1 3 2 6 6
2 1 1 1 1
5 1 1
Extended Labor 0 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 4 3
Coverage (years) 1 1 1
5 it 2 4 4
Original Purchaser
Limitation 1 1 3 1 4 3
Exclude Consequential
Damages I 1 1
Dislaim
Merchantability 1 1 1 1
* Refrigerators, gas & electric ranges, washers, room air conditioners, color televisions. Both dryer warranties
are issued by the same firm (different subdivisions); their terms are generally identical. Only their composite market
share is available; thus, I treat them as one firm.
t Where all parts are covered for five years, I indicate extended as well as basic coverage.
t One manufacturer offers 10-year coverage of certain parts and labor expenses.
Sources:
1. Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
2. Derived from Who's Who and What's What in the Appliance Industry, 22 APPLIANCE MANUFACTURER 60,
65 (1974).
3. Id.
that of larger firms. Five of twenty-one relatively small firms (seven per-
cent market share or less) offer no extended parts coverage, whereas only
one of nine firms with a market share greater than seven percent offers no
coverage. Basic labor coverage appears equivalent between large and small
firms. Extended labor coverage provisions, however, provide greater sup-
port for the exploitation theory. A greater proportion of smaller than of
larger firms offer five-year labor coverage, although one firm with a
nineteen percent market share-General Electric, the largest manufac-
turer of air conditioners-offers ten-year extended coverage of selected
parts and labor expenses. Finally, the distribution of the exclusions of
liability tends to refute the exploitation theory. Limitations of coverage to
the original purchaser, disclaimers of the implied warranties, and exclu-
sions of consequential damages are relatively infrequent in the warranties
of firms possessing more than nine percent of a product market, but ap-
pear more often in the warranties of smaller firms.
The results of Table 1 might fail to support the exploitation theory
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because the Table does not distinguish atomistic from concentrated indus-
tries. Perhaps market power is more accurately measured by considering
the extent of competition between manufacturers in individual industries,
rather than the absolute size of the manufacturer alone. Tables 2 and 3
compare industry concentration to warranty content. Table 2 compares
concentration to the warranty duration and the service life expectancy of
the appliances. Column (2) presents Herfindahl concentration index esti-
mates" 6 for these product groups, in descending order of concentration.
Columns (3) and (4) show the duration of extended parts and labor cover-
age, respectively. The exploitation theory implies that as concentration is
greater, duration of coverage will be shorter.
Table 2. Industry Concentration, Warranty and Service-Life Duration, by Product, 1974
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Extended Extended Service
Parts Labor Life
Herfindahl Coverage2  Coverage' Expectancy'
Product N Index' (years) (years) (years)
Freezers 1 .225 5* 5* 20.4
Washers 5 .197 5 0 10.8
(4 manufacturers)
Electric Ranges 4 .193 3 0 12.1
(1 manufacturer)
Dryers 2 .191 2, 5 0 13.7
(1 manufacturer)
Refrigerators 5 .159 5 5* 15.2
Gas Ranges 2 .151 0 0 13.5
Color Televisions 3 .125 2 0 12.0
Room Air Conditioners 10 .099 5* 5
(7 manufacturers)
* Where all parts are covered for five years, I indicate extended coverage.
Sources:
1. Derived from Who's Who and What's What in the Appliance Industry, 22 APPLIANCE MANU-
FACTURER 60, 65 (1974).
2. Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
3. Ruffin & Tippett, Service-Life Expectancy of Household Appliances: New Estimates from the
USDA, 3 HOME ECON. RESEARCH J. 159, 169 (1975) (April 1973 sample).
Table 2 falls to support this implication. The least concentrated prod-
uct group-air conditioners-offers a duration of warranty coverage iden-
tical to that of both a moderately concentrated product group-
refrigerators-and a highly concentrated product group-freezers." 7 A
116. The Herfindahl index consists of the sum of the squares of the market shares (in percent of
sales) of each firm. See G. STIGLER, The Measurement of Concentration, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 29, 31 (1968). This measure is consistent with the exploitation theory because it gives
relatively greater weight to the market shares of larger firms than does the standard four-firn concen-
tration ratio.
117. These three products are similar in that each contains a sealed refrigeration unit. Cf pp.
1330-31 infra (discussing implication of investment theory with respect to extended coverage of prod-
ucts that contain sealed refrigeration systems).
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relatively unconcentrated product group-gas ranges-offers the least ex-
tensive duration of coverage." '8 Column (5) gives estimates of the first-
owner service life expectancy of the various appliances: a measure of the
average period of service of the product to the original purchaser.'19 Some
exploitation theorists would suggest that the power to exploit consumers
will be expressed in the technological durability of the product as well as
in warranty terms.'2 0 Column (5), however, does not confirm that hypoth-
esis. Indeed, the product of the most concentrated group-freezers-is also
the most durable.
The evidence most persuasive to judicial acceptance of the exploitation
theory, however, was the correspondence between the high level of concen-
tration in the automobile industry and the restridive content of automo-
bile warranties, in particular, the prevalence of disclaimers and exclusions
of liability.'2 ' The automobile industry, of course, is more highly concen-
trated than any of the appliance industries, and its warranties are more
restrictive. Perhaps a view of concentration and warranty content that in-
corporates a broader range of products would confirm the implications of
the exploitation theory?
Table 3 compares the major warranty exclusions with industry concen-
tration for thirteen product groups: the automotive products (automobiles,
recreational vehicles, coaches, and travel trailers), the appliances, and on-
site mobile homes. Columns (2) and (3) present Herfindahl index and
four-firm concentration measures for these products; columns (4), (5), and
(6) indicate the proportion of sample warranties incorporating the major
exclusions.
Table 3 confirms the extraordinary concentration of the automobile in-
dustry and the great frequency of exclusions in automobile warranties, at
least in comparison to the appliance groups (except, notably, dryers). Ta-
ble 3 shows, however, that the frequency of exclusions in recreational ve-
hicles, coaches, and, in part, in travel trailers is as high as in warranties of
automobiles. Recreational vehicles, coaches, and travel trailers, of course,
are industries of low concentration. By either of the two measures, they
are many times less concentrated than even the appliance groups and are
among the most atomistic of all manufacturing industries.
118. Although this sample contains only one freezer and two gas range warranties, the Gerner
and Bryant study showed similar durations of warranty coverage for these products. Market Signal,
supra note 43, at 13 (Table 2).
119. The estimate was drawn from a nationwide sample, although the article does not indicate
when the survey was conducted. See Roussos & Konopa, Ownership Levels, Acquisition and Disposi-
tion Channels of Selected Consumer Durable Used-Goods, 8 AKRON BUS. & ECON. REV. 30 (1977).
120. See Prosser, supra note 27, at 158-65 (unless courts regulate sales transactions, manufactur-
ers will sell "worthless junk").
121. Seep. 1302 supra (discussing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960)); note 114 supra (same).
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Table 3. Industry Concentration and Warranty Exclusions, by Product, 1974
Proportion
Proportion Limiting
Four- Proportion Excluding Coverage
firm Disclaiming Conse- to
Herfindahl Concen- Merchant- quential Original
Product N Index' tration' ability' Damages' Purchaser
Automobiles 4 .359 100 75 75 0
Freezers 1 .225 71 0 0 0
Washers 5 .197 73 0 0 40
Electric Ranges 4 .193 73 0 0 25
Dryers 2 .191 73 100 100 100
Refrigerators 5 .159 72 20 20 20
Gas Ranges 2 .151 75 0 0 50
Color Televisions 3 .125 60 0 0 66
Room Air Conditioners 10 .099 59 20 20 40
Recreational Vehicles 5 .078' 443 80 100 80
Travel Trailers 4 .053 33 50 50 100
Coaches 5 .0341 28' 80 80 60
Mobile Homes 4 .027 29 50 25 25
Sources:
1. Derived from 1975 AUTOMOBILE FACTS & FIGURES 14 (automobiles); Who's Who and What's
What in the Appliance Industry, 22 APPLIANCE MANUFACTURER 60, 65 (1974) (freezers, washers,
electric ranges, dryers, refrigerators, gas ranges, color televisions, and room air conditioners); R.L.
POLK & Co., NEW MOTOR HOME, TRAVEL TRAILER AND MOBILE HOME REGISTRATION SERVICE
(1974) (includes all United States registrations, except Oklahoma; concentration measures include
manufacturer rather than brand product share, which may overstate concentration; insignificant firms
not accounted for individually comprise 10%, 14%, 8%, and 20% of recreational vehicle, coach, travel
trailer, and mobile home figures, respectively; these firms were not included in concentration
measures).
2. Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
3. For some firms, only joint recreational vehicle-coach registrations were available. I'use the
summary figure in both categories, and thus overstate actual concentration. Recreational vehicles and
coaches are built upon chassis manufactured by the three largest automobile firms. Recreational vehi-
cle and coach warranties, however, extend only to independently added equipment; chassis are war-
ranted separately. See p. 1329 infra (Table 5).
These data suggest that the correlation between concentration and re-
strictive warranty content in automobile warranties is spurious. Indeed,
Table 3 demonstrates that there is no clear relation between concentration
levels and product warranty content. Table 3 does suggest that, with re-
spect to exclusions of liability, there are great similarities, first, within the
warranties of the automotive products and, second, within the warranties
of appliances, regardless of concentration. I shall explain, below, that
these similarities appear to derive from the different ways consumers use
appliances and automotive products, an explanation which is consistent
with the investment theory.
t22
122. See pp. 1333, 1334, 1338, 1345-46 infra.
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2. The Signal Theory: Warranty Duration and Service Life Expectancy
The signal theory rests on the assumption that warranty terms reflect
the mechanical durability of the product. According to the theory, the
costs of comprehending warranty information require consumers to gener-
alize information about a range of related products. Generalization may
attenuate to some extent the correspondence between warranty duration
and service life. M Thus, the duration of coverage may not equal product
service life exactly. The signal theory's fundamental implication, however,
is that the relationship between warranty duration and service life expec-
tancy is direct and positive and is a relationship upon which consumers
can, with confidence, base their purchasing decisions.12 4
Table 4 compares the duration of basic and extended parts coverage
with measures of expected service life for various appliances and for
automobiles. The products are listed in descending order of service life
expectancy. Column (4) gives estimates of the duration of service life to
original owners of these products. Column (5) gives estimates of the total
service life of the product itself, regardless of the number of owners. 25
Table 4 shows only a very crude relationship between warranty dura-
tion and life expectancy. The single warranty of the most durable prod-
uct-freezers-offers the longest period of basic parts coverage. However,
three of five warranties of the appliance with the least durabil-
ity-washers-offer a period of basic parts coverage twice that of seven-
teen warranties of the more durable products-color televisions, electric
and gas ranges, dryers-and four warranties of refrigerators. In addition,
the warranties of two appliances that are most durable-freezers and re-
frigerators-offer the longest period of extended parts coverage, but so do
the warranties of the least durable appliance-washers. Moreover, there
is no ordinal relationship among the appliances of intermediate durability.
More curious is the relationship that Table 4 reveals between service
life expectancy and the absolute level of warranty duration. The service
life expectancies of the appliances range from eleven to twenty years. The
signal theory assumes that it is economical for consumers to generalize
information about the basic coverage terms of various products. The sim-
plified categories of Table 4, in fact, seem to bear out the generalization
hypothesis. Although there are some variations, seventeen of the twenty-
123. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 77-78.
124. Id. at 77-79.
125. The figures result from separate studies: the estimates of service life to first owners, column
(4), derive from an extensive nationwide sample. See note 119 supra. The estimates of total product
life (all owners), column (5), derive from a 1970 Whirlpool Corporation study of Whirlpool products,
which may differ from the average.
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Table 4. Product Service-Life Expectancy and Duration of Parts Coverage, by Appliance, 1974
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Duration Duration Service Life Total
Basic Extended Expectancy Service
Coverage' Coverage' for First Life
(years) (years) Owner' Expectancy'
Appliance N (by firm) (by firm) (years) (years)
Freezers 1 5 5* 20.4 18
Refrigerators 5 1 (4), 5(1) 5* 15.2 15
Dryers 2 1 2, 5 13.7 15
Gas Ranges 2 1 0 13.5
Electric Ranges 4 1 3 (1) 12.1 14
Color Televisions 3 1 2 12.0
Washers 5 1 (2) 5 (4) 10.8 12
2 (3)
Appliance Average 14.0 14.8
(nonweighted)
Automobiles 4 1 0 9.4
Note: Numbers in parentheses within the table indicate manufacturers.
* Where all parts are covered for five years, I indicate extended as well as basic coverage.
Sources:
1. Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
2. Ruffin & Tippett, Service-Life Expectancy of Household Appliances: New Estimates from the
USDA, 3 HOME ECON. RESEARCH J. 159, 169 (1975) (April 1973 sample).
3. Appliances: Whirlpool Corporation, Marketing Studies Department, 1970 Study (on file with
Yale Law Journal). Automobiles: Teknekron, Inc., Factors Influencing Product Durability, reprinted
in SEN. REP. No. 12, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 139, 168 (1973) (study undertaken around 1970).
two appliance warranties, as well as the four automobile warranties, offer
basic-parts coverage for one year.
2 6
The peculiarity of this finding; however, is apparent. Why is basic-
parts coverage of one year the generalized durability signal of these prod-
ucts? The average service life of all appliances is, according to one mea-
sure, 14.0 years and, according to the other, 14.8 years. The shortest ser-
vice life expectancy of the appliances within the set is, by one measure,
10.8 years and, by the other, 12 years. If warranty duration is a signal of
the purely mechanical characteristics of a product, without regard to a
consumer's allocative investments in prolonging product life, what ex-
plains a durability signal of one year, rather than ten years or fourteen
years? The signal theory does not answer this question and suggests no
method for discovering an answer.'27
126. A more careful inspection of the warranties, however, discloses that one-year parts coverage
is only a residual term from which there are many variations. See note 174 infra.
127. Also inconsistent with the signal theory are the offer by retailers and manufacturers of dif-
ferent warranty coverage, see p. 1318 supra, and the distinctions with respect to coverage among types
of purchasers and uses of the product, see pp. 1331-38 infra. In each case, the technological character-
istics of the product-the subject matter of the signal-are identical, even though the signals are
different.
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B. Differences in Specific Warranty Provisions
This subpart examines the contents of the sample warranties more
carefully. It reviews specific warranty provisions and considers whether
differences with respect to these provisions in the warranties of different
products are explained most persuasively by the exploitation, signal, or
investment theory.
I. The Duration of Parts Coverage
The parts coverage provision of most product warranties has two ele-
ments: the first establishes coverage of most product parts for some basic
term-commonly one year; the second defines exceptions to this basic
coverage." 9 The exceptions consist, for specific product parts, of exclusions
from coverage altogether, limitations of coverage to periods less than the
basic term, or extensions of coverage beyond the basic term.
The three theories interpret these parts provisions differently. Provi-
sions excluding or limiting parts coverage are consistent with the exploita-
tion theory. This theory, however, does not indicate which parts will be
excluded from coverage nor, for that matter, why all parts are not ex-
cluded from coverage. In addition, it does not explain why some parts are
given extended coverage. The implications of the signal theory are equally
unclear. Gerner and Bryant predict a lack of uniformity across products
in the parts excluded from coverage because consumers are unaware of
the exclusions."' They also predict, at one point, that manufacturers will
exclude those aspects of coverage most costily to them13' but, at another,
that the parts excluded will be those inexpensive and easily repaired by
consumers." 2 Finally, according to the investment theory, the treatment of
product parts will be related to differences in risk between consumers as a
consequence of differences either in intensity or volume of use of the
product.
3
128. For a more precise evaluation of how common one-year parts and labor coverage is, see note
174 infra.
129. In my view, this structure itself influenced the formation of the exploitation theory. Some
statements of the exploitation theory view the warranty as giving the appearance of coverage while in
fact limiting and disclaiming coverage. The structure also influenced the formulation of the signal
theory, which views a consumer as comprehending the basic terms of coverage but ignoring exceptions
and exclusions of liability. Since the number of exclusions and disclaimers is quite small, the advan-
tage in simplicity of this structure is apparent. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a warranty in
which the manufacturer lists all the parts and characteristics of the product to which coverage is
extended.
130. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 84.
131. Id. at 84-85.
132. Id. at 81 n.7.
133. Gerner and Bryant, in the sole empirical study of parts coverage, found warranties providing
only extended rather than limited terms of parts coverage, a fact they interpret to be consistent with
the signal theory's prediction of pressures toward greater-than-average coverage. Id. at 82-84 (Tables
1 & 2).
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Table 5 lists product parts excluded from coverage in the warranties of
my sample. There is little uniformity across products in parts excluded,
which is consistent with the (weak) implication of the signal theory. The
signal theory's more precise implication, however, is not confirmed. The
parts excluded appear to be neither those most costly to manufacturers nor
those most easily repaired by consumers. Certainly, the dollar value of
light bulbs and gaskets in comparison to other product parts is small. But
many excluded parts, such as plastic parts, the trim and finish, enamel,
and porcelain and glass pieces, are likely to be specific to the particular
product model. The consumer has no evident cost advantage in providing
replacements for these parts.13














5 Light bulbs, plastic parts, gasket, porcelain,
exterior finish, fuses
1 Plastic parts, gasket
6 Light bulbs, finish or trim
5 Light bulbs, porcelain
2 Light bulbs, glass pieces (one manufacturer
excludes all nonworking parts)
10 Air filters
3 Antenna system (two manufacturers)
2 Plastic parts, needles, batteries, knobs, cabinets
4 Paint, appearance (one manufacturer); tires
separately warranted
5 Chassis, tires, appliances, all separately
warranted
Coaches 5 Fabrics, carpets, windows, windshield (one
manufacturer); chassis, tires, appliances, all
separately warranted
Truck Mounts 4 Interior surface (one manufacturer); chassis,
tires, all separately warranted
Travel Trailers 5 Tires, batteries, appliances, all separately
warranted
On-site Mobile Homes 4 Non-integral furniture, plumbing and
appliances, all separately warranted
Source: Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
134. Some warranties exclude only those components warranted separately by the component
manufacturer. Prosser believed that exclusions of this nature were unfair to consumers because of the
potential obstacles to recovery from the component manufacturer. See Prosser, supra note 28, at 1124.
Several warrantors in the sample, however, offer to aid the consumer in pursuing component war-
ranty claims.
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The parts excluded from coverage in Table 5, however, can be inter-
preted as those product components most vulnerable to different intensities
of use by consumers. The parts typically appear to be either easily break-
able-glass and plastic parts, porcelain, phonograph needles-or exterior
parts sensitive to scratching, abrasion, or rough use-paint, cabinets, the
finish or trim. Differences between consumers in volume of use may affect
some of the parts, such as batteries and fuses.135
Product parts given coverage less than the standard one-year term are
similar.'36 One range warranty limits coverage of glass and other finishes
on the range to a thirty-day period. A stereo warranty limits coverage for
defects in cabinets, wood products, plastic protective covering, knobs, dress
panels, and trim to a period of ten days. Several warranties offer coverage
of porcelain parts and other parts of the finish only until the buyer has
completed an initial inspection of the product. These warranties offer
some insurance against defects in manufacture or delivery, but they re-
quire consumers to determine the existence of such defects within a very
short period, before the risk of the consumer's participation in the damage
increases substantially.
Many warranties also cover specific product parts for periods well be-
yond the basic one-year term. Refrigerator, freezer, and air conditioner
warranties, for example, commonly offer five-year coverage of the sealed
refrigeration system. Similarly, most warranties of washing machines in
the sample offer five-year coverage of the machine's transmission. The
Airstream travel trailer warranty covers the metal shell, frame, and axle
assembly for life to the first owner. Each of the television manufacturers
offers two-year coverage of the picture tube.137
Again, the selection of these parts for extended coverage cannot be ex-
plained convincingly as a form of exploitation or signaling. Yet the parts
have two similar characteristics that lend support to the investment the-
ory. First, they are the parts most critical to the continued productive ca-
pacity of the good. M  The failure of a refrigerator's sealed cooling system,
for example, imposes a much greater loss on a consumer than does dam-
135. The exclusion of coverage of the antenna system in the two television warranties is difficult
to interpret. The third television warranty, which describes coverage more elaborately, excludes cover-
age of home antenna systems, rather than coverage of the system that accompanies the individual set.
Perhaps the other two warranties are meant to be interpreted similarly.
136. Gerner and Bryant do not discuss such provisions. See Market Signal, supra note 43.
137. In addition, coverage is offered, in one recreational vehicle warranty, of defects in body lami-
nation for the lifetime of the product; in one air conditioner warranty, of the "Lexan" protective cover
for ten years; in one electric range warranty, of the heating unit and surface controls for three years;
in one dryer warranty, of the drum assembly for five years; and in one stereo equipment warranty, of
the turntable and receiver for two years and of the speakers for five years.
138. Gerner and Bryant make a similar observation, but do not attempt to reconcile it with the
implications of the signal theory. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 82.
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age to a tray or shelf. Where the magnitude of the potential loss is greater,
consumer demand for a performance bond from the manufacturer-or for
insurance" 39-is likely to be greater.
Second, these parts are housed deep within the product, protected by
the product's outer shell and often by padding and internal bracing. They
are thus likely to be less susceptible to damage from rough handling or
careless treatment short of active misuse."' These parts, of course, remain
subject to differences in the volume of use between consumers-which
could explain why the duration of extended coverage is substantially less
than most measures of the productive life of the machine."' But it is plau-
sible that differences between consumers in prevention costs affect these
parts less than they do the exterior cover and operating controls of which
coverage is shorter.
1 2
2. The Commercial Use Excusion
Product warranties commonly deny coverage altogether if the product is
put to commercial, rather than to domestic, use. Neither the exploitation
nor the signal theory provides a plausible explanation of this exclusion. As
a first approximation, the bargaining position of a commercial buyer is
equivalent to that of a manufacturer, or at least is much less disparate
than the bargaining position of a consumer. Yet it is the commercial buyer
rather than the consumer who is excluded from coverage.
The exclusion of commercial use also seems inconsistent with the signal
theory. If warranty terms signal the purely technological characteristics of
a good at the time of purchase, then there is no reason to distinguish
between domestic and commercial buyers. Furthermore, the signal theory
suggests that exclusions appear in warranties where the costs of informa-
tion about the likelihood of losses are relatively high. It stretches the im-
agination, however, to believe that information about the likelihood of
139. It is very difficult to segregate empirically demand for a performance bond from demand for
insurance. The dollar value of many consumer products is sufficiently low to question whether the
loading costs of manufacturer-insurance are worth bearing.
140. The manufacturers universally exclude coverage of "defects" caused by consumer misuse.
141. See p. 1327 supra (Table 4).
142. Some warranties incorporate provisions limiting coverage of repair parts to the original dura-
tion of the warranty. There is no reason why coverage of repair parts, but not of original parts, is an
avenue of exploitation. Nor is there a coherent description of how differential consumer information
would lead to a distinctive treatment of repair parts.
Two possible explanations of the provision are consistent with the investment theory. First, the
interaction of a new part with the remaining used parts, like a new saddle on a horse, could increase
the likelihood of product breakdown. Thus, the level of claims regarding even the new part could be
differentially greater. Second, the repair itself may indicate a significantly higher intensity of con-
sumer use of some specific product part. Thus, the provision might serve to segregate ex post, rather
than ex ante, those consumers for whom the costs of repair are differentially higher. The provision
might also serve to record for the manufacturer exactly when its obligation ends. The costs of account-
ing for the remaining coverage of repaired items, however, are probably not significant.
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product losses is less available to a commercial buyer than to a consumer.
According to the investment theory, an exclusion from coverage reduces
differences in risk between purchasers of a product. Commercial purchas-
ers may subject a product both to a greater volume of use over a given
period and to a greater intensity of use, especially where the product is
rented to others, such as a washer or dryer at a laundromat. A person
renting rather than owning a product is less likely to invest in "care" in
order to optimize the productive life of the machine.1"3 According to the
investment theory, however, the express exclusion of commercial use from
warranty coverage is related to other methods a manufacturer may have to
segregate consumers by differences in risk, such as differences in model
design or selective marketing techniques. Unfortunately, the warranty
sample provides no information concerning such alternative methods
available to manufacturers.
Within the sample, the warranties of washers, dryers, freezers, and gas
ranges exclude commercial use universally; the warranties of some refrig-
erators (four of five), electric ranges (three of four), televisions (one of
three), travel trailers (one of five), recreational vehicles (two of five),
coaches (two of five), and truck mounts (two of four) exclude it; and the
warranties of cookware, air conditioners, stereos, automobiles, and on-site
mobile homes do not exclude commercial use.
The warranty data alone are insufficient to support fully an explana-
tion of these different treatments of the commercial use exclusion consis-
tent with the investment theory. Two limited observations, however, can
be made. First, subtle differences in definitions of the commercial use ex-
clusion in various warranties indicate attempts to reduce differences in
risk. Several warranties, for example, define coverage in terms of the
product's household function rather than of its actual use. Thus, the prod-
uct is warranted to'commercial users, but only to the extent normal for a
household. In addition, one refrigerator warranty excludes commercial use
only for the extended period of coverage (second through fifth years) of
the sealed refrigeration system; commercial and domestic purchasers alike
receive warranty coverage for the first year of use. The effect of the more
precise definition of the exclusion in these provisions is to extend coverage
more broadly for the residual set of consumers.
Second, manufacturers that are able to define the duration of warranty
coverage according to the volume of use of the product-manufacturers of
automobiles, coaches, and recreational vehicles who can measure warranty
duration by mileage-exclude commercial use less frequently, an outcome
143. A renter will invest only to the extent that he can gain the return from the investment during
the rental period.
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consistent with the investment theory. Of the eight warranties measuring
duration by mileage, only one excludes commercial use; in contrast, of the
six measuring duration by time, three exclude commercial use. These re-
lationships are not strong, and the distinction remains tentative. It is plau-
sible, however, that a manufacturer reduces the difference in the risks in-
troduced by commercial and domestic users by defining coverage in a way
that equalizes differences in rates of use over time between these purchas-
ers. Some difference in risk will persist, of course, because of differences
in the intensity of commercial and domestic product use.
3. Miscellaneous Use and Repair Exclusions
Several of the sample warranties exclude coverage of miscellaneous uses
or types of repairs peculiar to individual products. For example, the
Chrysler automobile warranty excludes coverage of repairs resulting from
"racing, sustained high speed use,. . . high speed acceleration or shifting
transmission gears at high engine RPM." The Midas recreational vehicle
warranty excludes coverage not only of all commercial uses but also of
personal recreational uses by a club or group. Several of the automotive
product warranties exclude repairs that result from carrying heavy loads
or hauling trailers. The KLH warranty excludes coverage of the costs of
demagnetizing stereo equipment.
None of these various exclusions can be easily explained as serving a
signaling function or as reflecting some special exploitative opportunity.'
4
The exclusions, however, seem related to uses of the product for which
warranty costs are likely to be substantially greater than usual. A club or
group, for example, can be expected to subject a recreational vehicle to
more intensive use than any single purchaser. ' Similarly, the strain on
an engine or transmission is likely to be greater if an automobile is used
for racing rather than for commuting or family driving.'46 This interpreta-
tion does not suggest that the products are not or could not be made suita-
ble for uses excluded from coverage, but only that repair costs for these
uses are likely to be substantially higher than for average use. A dominant
group of consumers not expecting to use the products in these ways may
prefer those products sold with the lower insurance premiums made possi-
ble by the exclusions.' 47
144. Neither the exploitation nor signal theorists have addressed these exclusions.
145. A gas range warrantor incorporates a similar distinction: the 1974 warranty limits coverage
to "normal household use." The 1978 warranty for the same product limits coverage more precisely to
"normal single family household use." Thus, multiple family household use was excluded in 1978.
146. See Whitford, supra note 11, at 1063.
147. The universal exclusion of damage due to consumer misuse is an obvious illustration of the
same point.
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Provisions that exclude coverage of defects that result from exposure of
the product-usually a vehicle-to natural weather or use conditions il-
lustrate the principle in a different way. The Superior coach warranty,
for example, excludes coverage if "circumstances beyond the control of the
manufacturer. . . cause the body or parts to become defective depending
. . . on where and how the owner drives, weather, atmospheric condi-
tions, varying road surfaces, individual driving habits and vehicle usage."
The Swinger truck mount warranty excludes coverage of damage from
"deterioration of paint, bright metal or soft trim from wear or exposure or
any stains to any surface or fabric. . . regardless of cause." In addition,
the Swinger warranty disclaims responsibility for "the re-caulking of the
body periodically, the re-coating of the roof around the vents, . . . [and]
the recoating of seams and roof edges."
The exploitation or signal theory might interpret these provisions as
indications that the product is particularly vulnerable to expected weather
conditions. The investment theory, on the other hand, suggests two rea-
sons why warranties might exclude deterioration from weather conditions.
First, consumers are likely to make different investments to prevent dete-
rioration, such as in the extent to which they garage vehicles or in the
frequency with which they clean and wax them. Second, in a national
market, individual products are likely to be exposed to weather conditions
that differ substantially in severity. For either reason, a dominant set of
consumers could prefer the exclusion of coverage of losses to products sub-
jected to deterioration from weather or use. The warranty sample alone,
of course, is insufficient to confirm either interpretation. It is instructive to
note, however, that the Swinger truck mount warranty does not exclude
coverage generally of the repair of all leaks in the roof or body, but only
excludes the obligation to repair leaks by the recaulking and recoating of
the body and seams after some period of initial use. The need to recaulk a
truck mount, as opposed to the need for initial caulking, is likely to differ
among consumers according to the extent of exposure to rapid tempera-
ture changes or other severe conditions." 8
Finally, the warranties of virtually all products terminate coverage if
148. Similarly, two automobile manufacturers offer basic coverage for 12 months, but restrict to
90 days the obligation to perform engine adjustments. A color television warranty limits coverage of
labor costs in adjusting and repairing the set to 90 days. A stereo warranty excludes coverage of stylus
wear, dial alignment calibration, and tape head cleaning. The vehicle warranties also commonly ex-
clude coverage of parts frequently replaced in normal maintenance such as spark plugs, filters, and
windshield wipers, although coverage is extended to original parts. These provisions illustrate the
same principle. All consumers expect to demand some level or number of adjustments or maintenance
parts, but the level or number may differ substantially according to the intensity of use or the particu-
larity of the individual consumer. As a consequence, some dominant set of consumers who use the
product less intensively may express a preference for the exclusion of adjustments and maintenance
parts from coverage.
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the consumer modifies or alters the product. Again, such a restriction has
no apparent exploitative or signaling function. It is not implausible, how-
ever, that the consumer's decision to substitute his own design expertise
for that of the manufacturer might lead to higher levels of product fail-
ure.1419 The virtually universal provision terminating warranty coverage if
repairs are made by an unauthorized service person or shop may be only
a special case of the same point."t 0
4. Limitation of Coverage to the Original Purchaser
Many warranties cancel coverage if the original purchaser sells or oth-
erwise transfers ownership of the product prior to the expiration of the
period of basic or extended coverage. These provisions would be consistent
with the exploitation theory only in the unlikely event that there exist
differences between the bargaining power of purchasers who resell prod-
ucts and of purchasers who retain them for the relatively limited periods
of warranty coverage.'" The signal theory provides a more plausible hy-
pothesis. If the buyer is uninformed at the time of the original
purchase-either because he does not read the warranty or because he
does not consider whether he will later want to resell the product-the
original purchaser limitation will mean nothing to him and will not affect
his purchase decision."' Thus the manufacturer may incorporate freely
this limitation into the warranty.153 The signal explanation, of course,
does not distinguish among individual products; because coverage to sub-
sequent purchasers always imposes some costs, the limitation should ap-
pear universally." 4
The investment theory suggests a different explanation. To the extent
that the intensity of the first purchaser's use cannot be detected by second-
149. Many warranties specify that the exclusion applies only if the modification contributes to the
defect, although others are drafted to exclude coverage if any modification is made. If the modification
is unrelated to the defect, the exclusion of coverage may appear exploitative. (But can it be shown to
be profit-maximizing?) For a confident conclusion, information is needed about the invocation of the
exclusion in practice.
150. The service center requirement may also provide a convenient means for the manufacturer to
obtain information about the sources of product defects. The requirement may be particularly impor-
tant to a manufacturer where the dealer has responsibility for preadjustment or assembly of the prod-
uct, so that dealer and manufacturer obligations are correctly allocated. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, however, has prohibited the requirement in Full
warranties because of the fear of tying arrangements. See Priest, supra note 65, at 251-52.
151. The service-life expectancy of products appears to be universally more extensive than the
term of warranty coverage. See p. 1327 supra (Table 4).
152. It is not sufficient, according to this hypothesis, that the buyer at the time of purchase appre-
ciate only some probability of future resale; rather, the buyer must systematically underestimate the
likelihood of resale and thus the cost to him of the original purchaser limitation. Spence believes that
consumers will systematically underestimate product risks. Spence, supra note 42, at 569-71.
153. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 78-79.
154. See id. (by inference).
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hand purchasers, those first purchasers who expect to transfer products to
others may invest relatively less in care and maintenance or may subject
products to a relatively greater volume or intensity of use prior to re-
sale."5 If so, second-hand items are more likely to require servicing."6 As
a consequence, purchasers who expect to retain products will prefer war-
ranties that limit coverage to the original purchaser in order to remove
second-hand items from the warranty pool. This explanation implies that
the appearance of the limitation will not be universal but will be corre-
lated, first, with the duration of basic or extended coverage-because the
longer the term, the greater the opportunity for the owner to use the good
intensively prior to resale-and, second, with the product's susceptibility
to reduction in service life from intensive use.
An extension of this theory explains why markets for second-hand
goods exist at all for some products and not for others. It is well known
that the size of second-hand markets differs dramatically for different
goods.157 The extent of the second-hand market in any product will be
determined by the relationship between the difficulty of estimating the re-
maining productive life of the good and the product's susceptibility to de-
terioration from intensive use by earlier owners."M Theoretical treatments
of markets for new and used durable goods have focused exclusively on
manufacturers' technological investments in order to demonstrate, in gen-
eral, that manufacturers in both competitive and monopolistic industries
will invest equally in increasing product durability.159 None of the studies,
155. In economic terms, purchasers expecting to resell resemble renters. See note 143 supra. Of
course, consumers may decide to resell a product after they discover that they have subjected it to
intense use.
156. A similar point is made in Akerlof, supra note 38, at 489-91, although his principal illustra-
tion assumes differentially inferior technological characteristics of certain items-"lemons"-rather
than differential levels of consumer investments. Akerlof considers consumer investments in illustra-
tions of health insurance, honesty, and credit but does not apply the point to products. See id. at 492-
94, 495-99. Akerlof also remarks that warranties are a means of counteracting the adverse selection
problem. Id. at 499.
157. A recent study, for example, shows that second-hand typewriters constitute 32.6% of the total
typewriter inventory while second-hand clothes dryers constitute only 11.5% and second-hand blend-
ers only 4.5% of the total dryer and blender inventories, respectively. See Roussos & Konopa, supra
note 119, at 31 (Table 2).
158. The ability to estimate remaining service life and the technological susceptibility of the prod-
uct to deterioration are related determinants of second-hand markets. As it becomes more difficult to
estimate service life, first-owners can employ an item with greater intensity without affecting the
resale price of the individual item. Such intense use, however, affects the price of the set of items
because the expected service life to second-hand purchasers diminishes.
159. Of course, price is higher in monopolistic industries. See, e.g., Benjamin & Kormendi, The
Interrelationship Between Markets for New and Used Durable Goods, 17 J.L. & ECON. 381, 388-
401 (1974) (competitive and monopolistic manufacturers have similar attitudes towards second-hand
markets); Miller, On Killing off the Market for Used Textbooks and the Relationship between Mar-
kets for New and Secondhand Goods, 82 J. POL. ECON. 612, 613-16 (1974) (comparing prices paid
for new and used books in competitive and monopolistic industries); Swan, Alcoa: The Influence of
Recycling on Monopoly Power, 88 J. POL. ECON. 76, 90-92 (1980) (prices rise when monopoly is
achieved in either primary or second-hand market); Swan, supra note 115, at 582 (monopolists ensure
1336
Warranties
however, has considered the role of investments by consumers in influenc-
ing the size of the second-hand market60 or the role of the warranty in
influencing optimal investments by consumers. 61 The investment explana-
tion suggests that the inclusion of the original purchaser limitation should
be inversely correlated (roughly)'62 with the size of the second-hand mar-
ket. The more susceptible a product is to intensive use, the smaller the
second-hand market for the product will be, and the more likely it will be
that warranty coverage is limited to the original purchaser.
Table 6 compares the original purchaser limitation in the sample war-
ranties to estimates of the extent of a second-hand market for each appli-
ance. Column (2) lists in declining order the proportion of warranties of
each product that incorporates the original purchaser limitation. Column
(2) shows that the limitation is far from universal, a result inconsistent
with the implications of the signal theory.1 63 Column (3) presents esti-
mates from a study of the proportion of used products among the total
market inventory of those products.' The two sets of figures appear to
support the implication that an inverse relationship exists between the
original purchaser limitation and the size of the used-goods market. 65 The
limited number of warranties of each product in the sample, however,
makes the result only suggestive. Column (4) lists the findings of the
Gerner and Bryant study, which fail to support the relationship.1 ' A fur-
ther, more careful study is needed.
greater profits by raising price rather than by reducing quality).
160. The point, however, may be inferred from Akerlof, supra note 38, at 489-91, discussed in
note 156 supra.
161. Most studies have considered goods that are relatively insensitive to consumer use, such as
aluminum, see Swan, supra note 159, land, see Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON.
143 (1972), and (perhaps, see note 157 supra) typewriters, see Benjamin & Kormendi, supra note 159.
162. Of course, there are other determinants of the extent of second-hand markets, including
changes over time in a particular consumer's demand for a product. For example, of the respective
total inventories of their products, second-hand boats comprise 48.3%, pool and ping-pong tables,
38.3%, and cribs, 27.7%. Roussos & Konopa, supra note 119, at 31 (Table 2).
163. Of the 62 warranties of the sample, 31 limit coverage to the original purchaser. Of the 106
warranties of the Gerner and Bryant sample, 36 limit coverage to the original purchaser. Market
Signal, supra note 43, at 85 (Table 3). Gerner and Bryant do not attempt to explain why the limita-
tion is not incorporated universally.
164. Roussos & Konopa, supra note 119, at 31 (Table 2). The article does not indicate when the
survey was conducted.
165. The inverse relationship is obvious, but the second-hand market estimates must be analyzed
carefully. Although individual product figures were not given for the sample as a whole, 37% of
second-hand products were obtained as gifts rather than by purchase. It is possible that products given
to others-say, by parents to children-are used prior to transfer relatively less intensively than prod-
ucts resold. Furthermore, the Roussos and Konopa study was conducted in Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
which may contain a population unusually homogenous in various respects including product use. If
so, the figures may reflect a larger second-hand market than exists in other cities.
166. I have corrected what appear to be arithmetical errors in the Gerner and Bryant table,
Market Signal, supra note 43, at 85 (Table 3).
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Table 6. Original Purchaser Limitation (1974) and Used Product
Inventory (1977), by Appliances
(i) (2) (3) (4)
Original Used Products Gerner-Bryant
Purchaser in Total Estimates Transfer-
Limitation' Inventory" ability Limitation'
Product N (percentage) (percentage) (percentage)
Dryers 2 100 11.5
Televisions 3 66 12.3 38
Stereo Equipment 2 50 12.5
Washers 5 40 14.4 33
Room Air Conditioners 10 40 29.6 23
Gas and Electric Ranges 6 33 29.4 44
Refrigerators 5 20 27.4 30
Freezers 1 0 25.7
Sources:
1. Warranties provided by Federal Trade Commission, June 1978.
2. Roussos & Konopa, Ownership Levels, Acquisitions and Disposition Channels of Selected
Consumer Durable Used-Goods, 8 AKRON Bus. & ECON. REV. 30 (1977).
3. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 14 (Table 3 (corrected)).
The investment hypothesis may be tested differently by examining the
original purchaser limitation in the warranties of automobiles, recrea-
tional vehicles, and coaches. The hypothesis implies that the original pur-
chaser limitation is less likely to be incorporated where purchasers who
use the product relatively extensively are removed from the warranty pool
by defining duration in terms of volume of use (for these products, mile-
age). 67 Of the eight warranties that define coverage by mileage, two limit
coverage to the original purchaser. Of the six warranties that define cover-
age by periods of time, however, five limit coverage to the original pur-
chaser. This finding tends to support the investment theory.'68
5. The Allocation of Warranty Labor Charges
The most basic form of warranty coverage is the promise to provide
replacements for parts found to be defective during the warranty term.
Most warranties also cover the labor costs necessary to complete the re-
pair; that is, the direct costs of replacing the defective part. Other warran-
ties, however, offer only partial coverage or no coverage of labor charges.
Some warranties, for example, cover the costs of the repair itself, but re-
quire the consumer to pay the serviceman's travel charges. Many more
167. Mileage can be observed by a second-hand purchaser. Thus, except to the extent of fraudu-
lent resetting of odometers, there is likely to be a less direct relationship between the size of the
second-hand market for these products and the incorporation of the original purchaser limitation.
Mileage, however, measures only volume and not intensity of use.
168. It is also consistent with the theory that one refrigerator warrantor limits coverage to the
original purchaser only for the five-year period of extended parts and labor coverage. Both the origi-




warranties require the consumer to pay the costs of transporting the defec-
tive product to a service center for repair.
Neither the exploitation nor signal theory suggests explanations of the
allocation of these various service charges. The signal theory implies, in
general, that the assignment will be similar across different products be-
cause of the need for uniform signals.169 Gerner and Bryant find one-year
parts and labor coverage in the warranties of at least seventy-one percent
of four of the five appliances studied, which they claim confirms the signal
theory. 170 They admit, however, that a large number of warranties provide
coverage of both parts and labor for periods greater and less than one
year. Many warranties offer parts coverage beyond one year, which they
explain as the consequence of the lower frequency of invalid claims where
coverage above rather than below the average is offered.171 A much larger
proportion of their sample warranties, however, restricts labor service cov-
erage below the one-year term, a finding which is inconsistent both with
the prediction of uniformity and with the special explanation of parts cov-
erage. Gerner and Bryant explain the less extensive coverage of labor
charges as related to the lower costs to the manufacturer of monitoring
"warranty claims for invalid labor [as opposed to parts] charges."1 72 They
also assert that because of the greater dollar magnitude of labor costs than
parts costs, "dealers and manufacturers may prefer incurring consumer
dissatisfaction" by shifting labor costs to consumers.17 There is no plausi-
ble explanation consistent with the exploitation theory for differential cov-
erage of parts and labor charges.
1 74
The warranties of my sample show substantial variations from the uni-
formity predicted by the signal theory.77 Like the Gerner and Bryant
169. Alarket Signal, supra note 43, at 78-79.
170. In the fifth appliance, washing machines, one-year coverage appeared in 50% of the warran-
ties. Id. at 82.
171. See id. at 79, 82-83.
172. Id. at 82.
173. Id. at 83.
174. Is it more exploitative to offer a longer period of labor than parts coverage, or the reverse? It
is commonly thought that manufacturers exploit consumers by charging high prices for repair parts.
Consumers seem especially vulnerable because of the difficulty of finding substitute parts designed
specially to fit certain products. Substitutes for labor services to replace the parts, however, are availa-
ble at any service shop. Thus, it is inconsistent with the exploitation theory that, to the extent parts
and labor coverage differ, the warranties in the sample universally offer longer parts than labor cover-
age. In addition, some manufacturers guarantee that replacement parts will be kept in stock. The
Roper range warranties, for example, promise to stock functional parts for ten years and nonfunc-
tional parts for seven years.
175. My warranty sample confirms the uniformity hypothesis only by a superficial reading. If
only the basic term of coverage is examined-that is, if one ignores provisions extending or restricting
coverage of either parts or labor-then 41 of the 61 warranties provide coverage for one year. On the
other hand, if the provisions extending or restricting parts and labor coverage are included, only 12 of
the 61 warranties provide one-year parts and labor coverage. Most of these 12 warranties are of
vehicular products. One-year coverage of all parts and labor expenses is offered by 9 of the 23 vehicu-
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sample, most common are warranties that offer shorter periods of labor
than of parts coverage. The investment theory implies that manufacturers
will allocate labor charges in order to reduce differences between consum-
ers in the expected magnitude of those charges.
Table 7 indicates warranties that distinguish coverage of labor and
parts charges. Columns (2) and (4) indicate the number of warranties of
which the period of labor coverage is less than the period of parts cover-
age-in column (2) for the basic term and in column (4) for the extended
term of coverage. The warranties of washers, air conditioners, televisions,
dryers, on-site mobile homes, and, occasionally, vehicular products most
frequently offer more restricted labor than parts coverage. There are no
immediately apparent similarities among these products, although some
more limited observations suggest an investment theory explanation.
First, the allocation to the consumer of labor charges may be related to
the availability of service contracts. Many warranties allude to optional
service contracts that cover labor expenses for periods beyond those of
warranty coverage.176 The option of a separate service contract suggests an
interpretation different from those of the exploitation or signal theories.
Where a separate service contract is available, a consumer can determine
independently whether the additional labor coverage is worth the price.
The separate offer of labor coverage, for a separate price, reduces the
warranty premium tied to the sale of the basic product and thus may
optimize insurance sales. Only one of the sample warranties incorporates
the terms of the optional service contract. The Emerson air conditioner
service contract offers in-shop coverage of the sealed refrigeration system
for four years beyond the one-year warranty term at a price of five dol-
lars. Although I have no basis for evaluation, the price seems remarkably
low for the coverage offered and illustrates that the Emerson company
believes that most consumers prefer air conditioners with one year of labor
coverage and a five dollar discount than five years of labor coverage at the
higher price. Those consumers who prefer longer coverage, then, can
transact for it separately.
Second, the exclusion of coverage of service call and transport charges
may be consistent with the investment theory. These costs are likely to
differ among consumers according to the distance between the consumer's
lar product warranties, but by only I of the 34 appliance warranties and by 2 of the 4 on-site mobile
home warranties. A peculiar theory of consumer information must be fashioned to regard the similar-
ity between these 12 warranties as a signaling phenomenon.
176. Service contracts, typically, are sold separately; they were not provided with the sample
warranties.
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home and the manufacturer's service center.' For products sold nation-
wide, some consumers may live a sufficient distance from a service center
to affect significantly total service call and transport costs. Consumers lo-
cated more centrally may find it cheaper to bear service call and transport
charges themselves than to purchase coverage for such charges in a war-
ranty. In the sample, fifty-four of sixty-one warranties exclude service call
charges for some period of warranty coverage, and thirty-six of sixty-one
exclude service call charges completely (column (5)). Forty of sixty-two
warranties exclude coverage of transport charges (column (6)).
Service call and transport charges also seem to influence provisions that
limit warranty coverage on the basis of the location of the product at the
time it becomes defective. Many warranties provide that coverage is avail-
able only if the product is located within the United States and Canada,
within the United States alone, or within the contiguous United States
(excluding coverage in Alaska and Hawaii). The exploitation and signal
theories offer no ready explanation of these exclusions. All warranties in
the sample were collected from sources within the contiguous states. The
purchasers affected, thus, are not necessarily foreigners, who might be es-
pecially vulnerable or uninformed, but rather individuals who purchase
the product within the United States for foreign transport. Furthermore,
it is implausible that Canadians, Alaskans, or Hawaiians, as classes, are
more easily exploited or less able to process product information.
These exclusions might possibly be related to substandard performance
of electrical or water utilities in these locations, an explanation consistent
with the investment theory. Many warranties, however, specifically ex-
clude coverage of defects caused by abnormal electrical supply or mineral
deposits. Nevertheless, I cannot reject this explanation. 78
In my view the location exclusions are related to service call and trans-
port charges. It is not implausible that charges are high relative to the
mean for a serviceman to travel or for the good to be transported within
foreign countries, across the expanses of Alaska or between the various
Hawaiian islands, and are especially high for transport to the contiguous
177. The allocation to the consumer of various labor charges resembles coinsurance or deductible
provisions in more typical insurance contracts. Coinsurance requires the insured to pay some share of
the total expense of each claim. An insurance deductible, on the other hand, requires the insured to
pay upon recovery some initial fixed amount, unrelated to the magnitude of the claim. The obligation
to pay the labor costs of repairing a defect resembles coinsurance, because the payment that the con-
sumer makes is likely to vary with the seriousness of the defect. The consumer's obligation to pay the
serviceman's travel charges to the site of the product or the cost of transporting the product to a service
center resembles an insurance deductible. The cost is incurred for each claim, but is fixed and, thus,
unrelated to the seriousness of the defect. Coinsurance and deductibles, of course, are common meth-
ods of placing incentives on the insured to take precautions to avoid losses.
178. The foreign use exclusions are not incorporated universally in the warranties. Thus, it is not
likely that they are related to differences in warranty law between jurisdictions.
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states. This explanation does not presume that these locations lack dealers
or service centers, but only that the distance between service centers and
consumers is relatively greater-perhaps only because there are fewer
centers-in these locations than in the contiguous United States. Again,
both manufacturers and the dominant set of consumers may gain by shift-
ing these charges to foreign buyers who can differentially invest to prolong
service life, rather than by increasing the insurance premium for all buy-
ers to cover the additional costs peculiar to this relatively small set.
This hypothesis implies that manufacturers are more likely to exclude
foreign coverage if the warranty allocates transport charges to the manu-
facturer than to the consumer. The evidence from the sample is generally
consistent. Of twenty-two warranties allocating transport costs to the
manufacturer, fourteen exclude foreign coverage (sixty-four percent). On
the other hand, of forty warranties allocating transport charges to con-
sumers, twelve exclude foreign coverage (thirty percent). Examined differ-
ently, of sixty-two warranties, twenty-six exclude foreign coverage and
twenty-eight require consumers to pay transport charges. Only eight war-
ranties in the sample provide foreign coverage of transport charges. Simi-
larly, only thirteen of the sixty-two sample warranties provide coverage of
transport charges from Canada. Finally, several warranties incorporate
separate terms offering coverage in Alaska and Hawaii, but specifically
excluding coverage of transport charges from these locations.
6. The Disclaimer of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability and
the Exclusion of Consequential Damages
The Uniform Commercial Code implies a warranty of merchantability
in all sales contracts. 79 The warranty requires that the item be of suffi-
cient quality to "pass without objection in the trade" and that it be "fit for
* , .ordinary purposes."' 80 The Code allows a disclaimer of the warranty
of merchantability provided that certain technical requirements are met."'
At the time the warranties in the sample were issued, however, such a
disclaimer was prohibited by statute in several states and was rendered
ineffective by judicial decision in many others.'82 If the warranty of
merchantability or any other general warranty is breached, the Code
awards the buyer the costs of repairing or replacing the product as well as
179. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
180. Id. § 2-314(2)(a), (c).
181. Id. § 2-316.
182. See Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Pro-
tection, 23 U. KN. L. REV. 567, 577-97 (1975). Unfortunately, I have no information about the
particular sales areas of the sample products.
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consequential damages."8 3 Consequential damages represent losses that re-
sult from the inability of the buyer to make use of the product for a pur-
pose that could be anticipated by the seller.'84 In modem times, conse-
quential damages of the greatest magnitude occur where product failure
causes personal injury, and may include hospitalization costs, disability
income, and the value of pain and suffering.
The disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability has always appeared
suspect. It seems peculiar for a manufacturer to deny openly that its prod-
uct can "pass without objection" or is ordinarily fit. Indeed, the attitude of
manufacturers toward what appears to be an unexacting standard has
provided substantial fuel for both the exploitation and signal theories. The
disclaimer of a warranty of no greater than ordinary product quality ap-
pears quintessentially exploitative.""5 Similarly, such a disclaimer dis-
played conspicuously in a product warranty' 8' seems to corroborate the
signal theory's assumption that consumers are ignorant of warranty terms
at the time of purchase.
The exploitation theory implies that all manufacturers will both dis-
claim the implied warranty of merchantability and exclude coverage of
consequential damages. The implication of the signal theory is similar,
except that the disclaimer and exclusion derive from consumer ignorance
rather than more typical sources of monopoly power. The investment the-
ory, however, suggests different interpretations of the two provisions. The
effect of the legal implication of the warranty of merchantability is to
delegate to a jury the judgment of what are the "ordinary" purposes to
which a product may be put. A jury may appreciate the class of consum-
ers and uses for which the product is designed. But if the jury errs, its
verdict will charge a manufacturer for the failure of a product to satisfy a
use not preferred by the dominant class of consumers, making both the
class of consumers and the manufacturer worse off. Manufacturers whose
183. U.C.C. §§ 2-713(l), -714(3). In addition, the Code awards incidental damages, which in-
dude the costs of inspecting or storing a defective product, arranging for its repair, or buying a
replacement. Id. § 2-715(1); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-3 (surveying case law
defining incidental damages).
184. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-4 (surveying case
law defining consequential damages).
185. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Chrysler Motor's reliance on a disclaimer of
implied warranties and on an exclusion of consequential damages to deny Mrs. Henningsen recovery
for her injuries most clearly revealed the operative characteristics of modern warranties. Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388, 405, 161 A.2d 69, 85, 95 (1960); see p. 1302 supra
(discussing Henningsen). Following Henningsen, most jurisdictions have routinely disregarded prod-
uct warranty terms where a consumer suffers personal injury. See Whitford, supra note 20, at 127 (in
automobile defect cases involving personal injury, courts have applied strict liability theory, and dis-
claimer of liability clauses have insignificant role). Thus, the consequential damages excluded by the
sample warranties are only commonplace forms of property loss, lost time, or inconvenience. See pp.
1350-51 infra (discussing implications of investment theory for personal injury liability).
186. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (requiring conspicuous display).
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products have a wide range of potential uses are exposed to greater risk
from this delegation and will be more likely to disclaim the implied war-
ranty of merchantability.187 On the other hand, manufacturers will ex-
clude consequential damages where the expected differences among con-
sumers in consequential losses are high.
Columns (8) and (9) of Table 7188 list the number of warranties that
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and exclude consequen-
tial damages.' 8 The disclaimers and exclusions are far from universal. Of
sixty-two warranties, only twenty-four disclaim merchantability and only
twenty-three exclude consequential damages. Furthermore, none of the
manufacturers within six of the sixteen product groups disclaims
merchantability and none within seven of the sixteen groups excludes con-
sequential damages. These figures, of course, are inconsistent with both
the exploitation and signal theories. Moreover, the data tend to refute the
exploitation and signal hypotheses in other ways. We have seen that there
is little apparent relation between firm market power and disclaimers or
exclusions.19 Furthermore, the distribution of disclaimers and exclusions
does not seem to correspond to coherent estimates of the level of consumer
information. Why should purchasers of dryers, automobiles, recreational
vehicles, and coaches be systematically less informed about disclaimers and
exclusions than purchasers of washers, televisions, ranges, and mobile
homes?
Upon closer examination of the data, it is warranties of the vehicular
products that most frequently disclaim the warranty of merchantability
and exclude consequential damages. The warranty of merchantability is
disclaimed in sixteen of twenty-three vehicular product warranties, as
compared with only six of thirty-four appliance warranties and two of
four mobile home warranties. Similarly, consequential damages are ex-
cluded in seventeen of twenty-three vehicular product warranties, but in
only five of thirty-four appliance warranties and in one of four mobile
home warranties.'" With respect to the disclaimer, the range of potential
uses may be greater for vehicular products than for appliances such as
ranges, washers, and televisions." 2 Moreover, the vehicular product war-
187. Provisions naming the manufacturer as the sole judge of whether a product is defective serve
the same function. See Marshall, supra note 94, at 883; Pauly, supra note 104, at 61.
188. See p. 1341 supra (Table 7).
189. Incidental damages are excluded by 11 of 62 firms. The exclusion may be related to the
allocation of service costs since the costs of a repair are considered as incidental damage. Nine of 11
warranties that exclude incidental damages place liability for transportation costs on the consumer.
190. See p. 1325 supra (Table 3).
191. The disclaimer of merchantability is not always accompanied by an exclusion of consequen-
tial damages. Of 24 warranties that incorporate at least one of the provisions, however, 18 warranties
both exclude consequential damages and disclaim merchantability.
192. I have no explanation, however, for the occasional appearance of the disclaimer in the war-
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ranties are those which most frequently incorporate exclusions of specific
uses, such as racing, towing, or hauling heavy loads. 9 '
Similarly, differences among consumers in the potential magnitude of
consequential damages may be greater for vehicular than for other prod-
ucts. Many vehicular warranties enumerate several elements of loss stem-
ming from the incapacity of the vehicle-loss of time, meals, lodging, the
cost of a rental car-that are specifically excluded from coverage. The
magnitude of these losses, of course, varies with the driving patterns of
each consumer. A more significant element of consequential loss is damage
to property where a defect leads to a traffic accident. The exclusion of
recovery for this loss, however, is likely to reflect only the relative superi-
ority of consumer self-insurance-by means of an accident or collision
policy more carefully designed to the individual's needs.' These explana-
tions of the data, however, are only suppositions. They cannot be con-
firmed or refuted from the warranty sample.
C. How Consumers May Register Preferences
It is a common belief that warranty content has little influence on con-
sumer purchase decisions because a consumer only learns warranty terms
after purchase or after discovery of a defect.'9 5 This belief has been closely
connected with the exploitation theory; 9" it explains how a manufacturer
is able to impose one-sided warranty terms. The signal theory also accepts
the proposition in large part: although consumers may possess some gen-
eral warranty information prior to purchase, they remain totally ignorant
of large numbers of significant provisions.' 97 Thus, according to both the
exploitation and signal theories, there is little relationship between con-
sumer preferences and warranty terms.
The actual influence of consumer preferences, of course, is an empirical
question. Neither exploitation nor signal theorists have compiled direct
empirical support for the absence of influence. The strongest direct evi-
dence, perhaps, derives from introspection. Most of us can recall occasions
as consumers in which we have been uninformed about warranty content
at the time of purchase. If the large majority of consumers behave simi-
larly, how is it possible, even in competitive product markets, for con-
sumer preferences to influence the way manufacturers draft warranties?
ranties of refrigerators (1), dryers (2), room air conditioners (2), and stereo equipment (1).
193. See p. 1333 supra.
194. See pp. 1350-51 infra (discussing superiority of self-insurance).
195. See, e.g., Staff Report on Consumer Product Warranties, House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Comm. 13 (Sept. 17, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journa).
196. See pp. 1300-01 supra.
197. See pp. 1303, 1305 supra.
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Competition with respect to warranty content may take two forms.
First, manufacturers compete, not over the entire set of consumers, but
over the set of marginal consumers. If a small group of consumers reads
warranties and selects among products according to warranty content,
manufacturers may be forced to draft warranties responsive to the group's
preferences, even though the large majority of consumers generally neglect
warranty terms. Second, warranty content may affect the repeat purchase
rather than the initial purchase decision. A consumer may select among
competing brands according to his experience with a specific product and
with its warranty."" If so, manufacturers may be forced to draft warran-
ties responsive to consumer preferences in order to assure a continued
custom. 99
The warranty sample provides only indirect (but highly suggestive) evi-
dence that consumer preferences for allocative investments and insurance
influence warranty terms. Further empirical study is needed for a precise
definition of the process of competition over warranty provisions.
IV. Implications of the Investment Theory
The previous Part shows, I believe, that the investment theory explains
warranty practices more comprehensively than either the exploitation or
signal theory. The evidence tends to confirm that the allocation of respon-
sibilities between manufacturers and different sets of consumers by stan-
dardized warranties is responsive to consumer preferences, and establishes
coherent economic incentives for manufacturer and consumer investments
to optimize productive services. Further research, of course, is required
before a confident conclusion can be reached. If, however, the validity of
the investment theory is presumed, that is, if manufacturers and consum-
ers invest to optimize productive services, what have been the effects of
modern judicial and legislative policies with respect to consumer product
warranties?
A. Optimal Prevention and Insurance
Courts have accepted the view that manufacturers employ standardized
198. A consumer, of course, may also rely on the advice of family members or friends with respect
to their experience with product warranties.
199. To the extent that its content is influenced by repeat purchase decisions, the warranty oper-
ates as a guide to the service and insurance that a warrantor will provide rather than as a perform-
ance bond. See p. 1309 supra. A warranty is necessary as a performance bond only where the con-
sumer fears that after purchase, the manufacturer will refuse service or insurance if the product is
defective. A manufacturer seeking repeat purchasers, of course, could not consistently refuse such
performance. The warranty may continue to serve as a performance bond, however, to first-
purchasers.
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warranties to exploit consumers, 00 and they have responded to exploita-
tive behavior in two ways. Courts have interpreted sales transactions to
provide more extensive warranty protection to consumers than the manu-
facturers themselves have offered voluntarily. The implication of warran-
ties of merchantability and fitness-as well as the prohibition on disclaim-
ing these warranties-and the expansion of the set of beneficiaries of
warranties by the elimination of the privity of contract requirement are
examples. In addition, courts have refused to give effect to manufacturer
attempts to segregate consumers by the level of risk they bring to the war-
ranty pool. Courts have refused to enforce warranty provisions that limit
remedies and that exclude consequential damages, in particular, personal
injury damages for which manufacturers are now strictly liable.
The implications of the investment theory with respect to these develop-
ments are clear: the warranty coverage required by courts is suboptimal
and increases the likelihood of product defects. It is well-established that
if, in a competitive market, consumers have different accident probabili-
ties, sales of contracts to insure-or to invest to reduce the probability of
loss-are optimized where the seller segregates consumers according to
levels of risk and sells each class of consumers a separate contract at a
separate premium reflecting the accident probability of the class.20' If sell-
ers are prevented from segregating consumers according to risk levels,
however, both manufacturers and consumers are worse off. First, there
may be no single insurance-allocative investment contract that satisfies the
preferences of both low- and high-risk consumers. 20 2 Put another way, at
a common premium, losses may be so disparate as to be uninsurable. Sec-
ond, even if a manufacturer can devise some single insurance-allocative
investment package that is attractive to some high- and low-risk consum-
ers, such a contract is likely to satisfy the preferences of these consumers
less fully than would separate contracts. Rothschild and Stiglitz have
shown that a single contract of this nature is likely to make high-risk
consumers no better off than would separate contracts, but will make low-
risk consumers worse off.
203
In limiting the segregation of consumers, courts and legislatures have
focused primarily on the remedial provisions of warranties-for example,
the exclusion of consequential damages, in particular, personal injury
200. See p. 1302 supra.
201. See, e.g., Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 104, at 629.
202. Akerlof, supra note 38, at 492-94; Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 104, at 637. For ease of
exposition, I discuss two risk levels, but the proposition holds for the grouping of any set of consumers
for which the risk of loss differs.
203. Relatively low-risk consumers are worse off because the premium (and perhaps the amount
of insurance available) are higher than if separate contracts were offered. Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra
note 104, at 638.
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damages. Subject to competitive pressures, manufacturers may be expected
to respond to these legal constraints by canvassing the range of alternative
techniques for identifying and segregating different risk classes. It is possi-
ble that some of the provisions discussed above" 4 that serve to segregate
different uses or consumers of products were introduced in response to the
extension of general warranty liability and the suppression of other risk
segregating methods. The term of basic coverage itself segregates consum-
ers by risk levels if consumers with different accident probabilities demand
different quantities of insurance.0 5 The one-year basic warranty term
may be especially common because it represents, given judicial and legis-
lative restrictions on other forms of risk segregation, a common minimum
point at which the insurance preferences of high- and low-risk consumers
converge.
A third implication of the investment theory is more striking and sug-
gests another method of testing the theory. The investment theory regards
consumer investments to prolong the life of a product as a substitute for
manufacturer investments to prolong product life.26 The warranty allo-
cates responsibilities between the parties according to the relative costs of
these investments; that is, the warranty allocates responsibilities to (places
liability on) consumers where the marginal cost of consumer investments
is lower than the marginal cost of manufacturer investments. Judicial de-
cisions expanding the manufacturer's warranty liability lead, however, to
the substitution of manufacturer investments for consumer investments. It
follows that judicial decisions lead to the substitution of more costly in-
vestments in place of less costly investments and, thus, increase the margi-
nal cost of investments to prolong product life. As the price of prolonging
product life (or any commodity) increases, the quantity of it demanded
declines. Therefore, judicial decisions expanding the warranty liability of
manufacturers will lead, at the margin, to fewer investments that serve to
prolong product life and to prevent defects than before. As a consequence,
product life will diminish and fewer defects will be prevented. Although
seemingly ironic, the investment theory implies that the judicial expansion
of manufacturer warranty liability diminishes product life and increases
the rate of product defects. 07
204. See pp. 1328-46 supra.
205. See p. 1319 supra.
206. See pp. 1309-11 supra.
207. Increased costs may lead to the sale of fewer products. As a consequence, the absolute num-
ber of defects may decline, although the rate of defects in those products sold will increase. The total
social loss from and increase in the defect rate, of course, must also consider those losses to third
parties previously disregarded by consumers in their purchase decisions.
The investment theory suggests that legal rules regarding warranties are inefficient, a finding incon-
sistent with Professor Posner's hypothesis of common-law rule efficiency. See R. POSNER, supra note
29, at 179-81. Many of these rules-the implication of warranties by law, restrictions on privity of
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B. The Investment Theory, Personal Injury Loss, and Strict Liability
The most dramatic development in product warranty law in the last
two decades is the abandonment of principles of warranty interpretation
and the adoption of a strict liability standard in cases involving personal
injury from a defective product. Crucial to the adoption of the strict lia-
bility standard is the empirical assumption that consumers can take no
action to prevent personal injury loss. 0 ' Given the assumption, it is diffi-
cult to justify warranty provisions excluding recovery for personal injury
damages.
Consumers, however, may prefer the exclusion of personal injury losses
from warranty coverage for various reasons. If personal injury losses, like
other forms of product loss, differ substantially among consumers of a
product, those consumers for whom the risk is relatively low may be bet-
ter off if no personal injury coverage whatsoever is offered. First, contrary
to the empirical assumption of the policy of strict liability, consumers may
differ with respect to the precautions that they take or the care with which
they use the product. Again, actions "preventing" (reducing the
probability of) personal injury loss may take subtle forms. Consumers
who take care, say, not to use machine products in the presence of by-
standers" 9 or who use such products only infrequently may subject the
warranty pool to a substantially lower level of risk than more intensive
users. This class of consumers may demand the exclusion of personal in-
jury losses from warranty coverage, and if the class is sufficiently large,
manufacturers might find that competition requires incorporation of the
exclusion.
The exclusion of personal injury losses can optimize investments to re-
duce the probability of product losses and to insure in a second way.
Product insurers are seldom able to obtain information about individual
consumers that health, home, and automobile insurers commonly employ
to define optimal risk classes.210 In general, product insurers must treat all
consumers as equals and charge each a warranty premium reflecting the
average risk level of the pool. The individual information collected in
other insurance contexts, however, may be effective in segregating optimal
classes for product insurance. If so, it would optimize insurance sales to
contract-derive from the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, a period from which Posner draws
much of the support for his hypothesis.
208. See, e.g., James & Dickinson, supra note 87, at 780.
209. This situation suggests how the requirement of horizontal privity of contract may serve to
reduce differences in risk. The requirement culls from the warranty pool family members, guests, and
bystanders. The number of such individuals exposed to risk from a product defect may vary substan-
tially among consumers. If the dominant class of consumers infrequently operates products in the
presence of third parties, the privity rule may optimize product sales.
210. See p. 1315 supra.
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offer product liability coverage as an aspect of health, home, or automo-
bile insurance, rather than as a separate policy tied to the sale of each
product."' An insurer could charge a lower than average premium to a
consumer for whom the risk of loss or the magnitude of expected damage
is relatively low, such as a consumer who is employed as a manual la-
borer, earns a wage rather than a salary, makes lower than average earn-
ings, or has a small family or relatively less valuable possessions. Again, it
is the consumer who subjects the pool to relatively low levels of
risk-whether the low level of risk derives from relative carefulness or
from a lower expected dollar loss from a disabling accident-who is most
harmed by lumping consumers into a single product insurance pool. Thus
the adoption of a strict liability standard has a regressive redistributional
effect. Consumers who are more careless or earn higher than average in-
comes are those for whom the warranty premium is less than the level of
risk that they introduce into the pool and are therefore the beneficiaries of
the strict liability standard.
The implications of involuntary manufacturer liability for personal in-
jury losses are similar to the implications of the expansion of warranty
liability generally.212 Most significantly, at the margin, consumer invest-
ments and manufacturer investments are substitute means of reducing the
probability of defects causing personal injury. As a consequence, the shift
to manufacturer liability increases the cost of these investments. Fewer
investments to prevent personal injury losses are likely to be made. Again,
the adoption of the strict liability standard is likely to have increased the




The superior predictive ability of the investment theory over the ex-
ploitation and signal theories could result from the greater empirical sig-
nificance, at the margin, of the determinants of the investment theory. I do
not believe, however, that sufficient evidence has been compiled to support
such a conclusion. Rather, the superiority of the investment theory with
respect to warranty content derives, in my view, from the nature of the
determinants of the theories. The determinants of the investment theory
are the costs of warranty coverage and differences in costs between con-
sumers; the determinants of the exploitation theory, the relative bargain-
211. The standard homeowner insurance policy offers coverage of various losses from defective
products, such as explosion or electric shock. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, SAMPLE INSUR-
ANCE POLICIES 14 (1975). 1 am indebted to Richard Epstein for this observation. Of course, most
automobile policies provide coverage of various losses that result from a defective automobile.
212. See pp. 1348-49 supra.
213. See note 207 supra.
1351
The Yale Law Journal
ing position of manufacturers and consumers; and the determinants of the
signal theory, the level of consumer information.
The determinants of the investment theory differ from the others in two
important respects. First, the costs of warranty coverage are more easily
defined and measured than either relative bargaining position or the
quantum of consumer information. As a result, the investment theory's
implications are likely to be both more precise and more readily verified
or refuted. Market share and concentration measures, for example, are too
crude to demonstrate any relationship between bargaining power and
warranty content.21 1 Similarly, although it is admittedly costly for consum-
ers to obtain information about product reliability, it is difficult to judge
how costly it is and what alternative sources of iriformation are available.
The more specific implications of the signal theory thus have no verifiable
basis. The implication that consumers generalize information from a
range of products requires a belief that consumers cannot read individual
product warranties to obtain current and specific information directly.'
1
In addition, the distinction between basic warranty terms that serve a sig-
naling function and exclusions that consumers ignore is arbitrary. Neither
of these implications can be refuted within the terms of the theory itself.
Gerner and Bryant justify several of the implications by comparing the
relative benefits to consumers with the costs to manufacturers of provi-
sions and exclusions. But if the benefits and costs of a provision deter-
mine consumer perceptions of the provision, then the study of benefits and
costs, rather than of perceptions, will provide the most accurate method of
predicting warranty practices. 7
The second important advantage of the determinants of the investment
theory over those of the alternative theories is that aspects of design, man-
ufacture, and use of a product are more likely to be determined by costs
than by relative bargaining position or consumer information. As a conse-
quence, a theory based upon costs allows the immediate comparison of
warranty practices to other production decisions and, thus, is more com-
prehensive than competing theories. It is the generality of costs as the
determinant of warranty content that generates the rich and diverse impli-
cations of the investment theory.
214. See pp. 1322-25 supra (Tables 1-3).
215. See note 58 supra (related criticism of signal theory).
216. Market Signal, supra note 43, at 78-79.
217. The signal theory, in addition, does not provide a comprehensive theory of consumer percep-
tion. For example, the theory offers no insight into the relationship between manufacturer investments
in establishing a reputation or brand name and in offering warranty coverage as signals of product
reliability.
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